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Abstract 
 
This research examined the nexus between the environment, conflict and security in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria as well as the factors that led to the conflict. Since the 
discovery of oil in 1956, the Niger Delta has been entrapped in environmental degradation 
as a result of oil mining, spurring a wide range of developmental challenges. Subsequently, 
by the 1990s, deepening poverty and underdevelopment, exacerbated by ecological 
problems, opened the space for the emergence of youth restiveness and a violent arms 
struggle. This violent struggle by the Niger-Delta youth seeks to challenge the legitimacy of 
the Nigerian state and the perceived corporate irresponsibility of Multinational Oil 
Companies (MNCs). Thus, the region faces security challenges triggered by neglect on the 
part of international and local oil companies and the failure of Nigeria’s central government 
to meet the developmental, environmental and security demands of local communities. 
Given this background, the research questions are: (1) In what ways do natural resources 
contribute to conflicts and environmental despoliation in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region? (2) 
Do the federal government and oil companies meet the demands of the community regarding 
environmental protection and the development and security of inhabitants? (3) Who are the 
actors in the resource conflict? To address these questions, the research used a triangulation 
approach, using primarily qualitative primary data sourced through 28 in-depth interviews 
and three focus group discussions of 5-7 people per group. The data obtained were coded 
and analysed thematically, and secondary quantitative data was used to supplement primary 
data. 
The original contribution of this research is in three main aspects: First, my research reveals 
a complex relationship between the local oil servicing contractors and the militant groups. 
There is strategic destructive alliance between these two actors underpinned by moral 
hazard. The oil servicing contractors employ the services of the local people to vandalise the 
vii 
 
oil pipelines in order for the MNCs to award contract to them for repair of the vandalised 
pipelines.  
Second, the Presidential Amnesty granted to the militants appear to have produced 
unintended outcomes in undermining productive economic activity and exacerbating 
insecurity in the region. The monthly payments of allowances to former militants under the 
amnesty programme incentivised the otherwise peaceful youths to join militancy to benefit 
from amnesty benefits. This intervention gives credence to the view that the federal and state 
governments only listen to those who take up arms against the state. 
Third, this research proposes a revised theoretical model that integrates two previous 
frameworks to illuminate the nature and context of resources curse. This integrated model 
brings together the rentier model and Dutch disease/resource curse to explain the 
characteristics and complexities of natural resource governance issues in Nigeria. It can be 
applied to other regions with similar challenges and profiles. 
Overall, the research has elicited significant theoretical and empirical insights into different 
views of the oil extraction, security and development. Recommendations are provided for 
future research and policy interventions.  
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Definition of the key terms 
Natural resource refers to any substances or natural assets which can be exploited for 
economic gain or used for economic production or consumption. In this case, natural 
resource is the crude oil in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Oil revenues payment obligation owed by any company or person to the government and 
people of the federal republic of Nigeria in respect of crude oil or refined oil sales anywhere 
in the world. The oil revenue shall be deposited only into the consolidated federation 
accounts with the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
 
Royalties: liquidated from the sales of crude oil or natural gas. 
 
State officials: an individual occupying a position of authority in the government of Nigeria. 
 
Oil resources: a deposit of hydrocarbons within the territory of the federal republic of 
Nigeria.  
 
Oil license: an approval granted by the government of Nigeria to companies to explore 
petroleum, only the federal government (state and local government have no rights to grant 
the license) through the Ministry of Petroleum resources that have the powers to issue the 
permit.  
 
Oil block: is an area of land awarded to oil drilling and exploration firms by the Department 
of Petroleum Resources. The federal government auctioned oil block to both local and 
international firms for a specified period. 
 
Acreage amount of an area in an offshore field under oil production sharing contract 
between the government and the oil extracting companies. 
 
Conflict: for the purpose of this research, conflict refers to a severe disagreement between 
the oil companies supported by the federal government and the resources bearing 
communities in the Niger Delta over the ownership of the oil resources. See civil war 
 
Civil war a war between citizens of the same country most triggered by ethnicity, religion, 
or resources ownership issues. The Nigerian civil war was fought between the predominantly 
Hausa Fulani dominated Muslim North and the Igbo majority Christian Southeastern region, 
respectively. 
 
Paradox of plenty see resource curse 
 
Environment the surroundings in which a human being, animal, or plant lives. For the 
purpose of this research, context refers to the area occupied by the people (including plant, 
animals, and water) in the Delta region. 
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Environment vanguard armed youth group in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria 
challenging the sovereignty of the oil companies and Nigerian state that destroyed their 
environment. The youth vanguards are demanding for the environmental mediation in the 
area. 
 
Environment security the examination of the threats melted by the environmental activities 
with more significant impacts on the ecosystem and communities.  
 
Militant an armed militant group in the Niger Delta. See environmental vanguard. 
 
Oil Spills contamination of sea or water by escaped oil due to the bursting of oil pipelines 
as a result of corroded pipes or destruction by the communities. 
 
Gas flaring it is a waste gas generated during the production at the oil and gas plants which 
is supposed to be controlled in a manner that would not harm the environment. It takes place 
at the oil and gas drill sites as well as refineries and landfills.  
 
Grabber friendly a weak institution in a country that allows corruption and mismanagement 
of the natural resources wealth for the benefits of the few elites.  
 
Corruption dishonest or fraudulent conduct by the people in the position of authority to 
accumulate wealth through bribery and inflation of contract.  
 
Ecological (derivation) fund a special allocation of money by the federal government to 
the oil-producing states in the Niger Delta region to provide development to the 
communities. 
 
Rentier model a situation in which a country derives all or a significant percentage of her 
national revenues from the rent of natural resources mortgaged to outside firms or clients.  
 
Resource curse it is present in abundant natural resources like oil, diamond and other 
minerals which tend to have less economic growth and worse development outcomes than 
the countries with fewer resources. 
 
Dutch Disease is the negative impact on the economy of a country that gives rise to a sharp 
inflow of foreign currency, due to the dependency on the oil and the neglects of the industrial 
and agricultural sectors of the country. For instance, since the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantity in Nigeria the traditional source of revenues (other products) become less price 
competitive on the international export market. 
 
Greed: it refers to an argument that combatants in conflicts are motivated by a desire to 
better their economic situation if the rewards of joining armed groups are greater than not 
participating. Greed is pursuing one’s own personal interest by any means necessary. The 
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case of Nigeria where the elites in charge of the state affairs are primitively wealthy through 
corruption. Also, the Niger Delta militants  
 
Oil bunkering is stealing crude oil from the criminal network groups in Nigeria in 
partnership with the international oil business people. 
 
Clean up programme it a project by the federal government to clean the Niger Delta 
environment destroyed by the oil activities.  
 
Amnesty a programme announced by the federal government of Nigeria in 2008 for the 
Niger Delta militants. It is complete disarmament of the armed youth in order to bring peace 
and security to the region. The amnesty programme involves training of the ex-militants and 
a monthly payment of allowances. 
 
Focus group session an interview involving about 5-7 in a group. 
 
In-depth interviews in-depth interviews on a one-to-one basis, i.e. between the researcher 
and the respondent. 
 
NVivo software a computer-assisted software for thematic coding and analysis of qualitative 
interviews transcript. 
 
Governance a method or system of government or management of the people by the 
legitimate authority. 
 
Federal Government is the highest tier with full authority to regulate Nigeria’s foreign 
policies, provision of domestic security and protection of the sovereignty as well as the 
citizens of Nigeria. President is the Head and Commander-in-Chief.  
 
State a second tier of government in Nigeria. There are 36 states which are led by an elected 
governor. 
 
Local government it is the third tier of government in Nigeria. There are 774 local 
government councils in Nigeria. 
 
Subvention it is monthly share of oil revenue and other incomes among the federal, states 
and local governments. 
 
Grievance bitter reactions that will lead to conflict over issues of identity, religion or 
ethnicity, ethnic or regional interest rather than over collective national economic interest. 
In Niger Delta, the grievance was influenced by the developmental issues as regards to the 
environment and security. 
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Horizontal inequality is inequality among culturally defined groups, defined by either their 
ethnicity, race, or religion or all. See vertical inequality. 
 
Vertical inequality   is a difference between individuals or households. In contrast, see 
horizontal inequality. 
 
South-south is one of the six geopolitical zone of Nigeria with six states; Rivers, Bayelsa, 
Akwa Ibom, Delta, Edo and Cross River. Almost all the oil exploration and exploitation 
takes place in the region. 
 
Niger Delta is Nigeria’s oil-producing region comprising of nine states, of which six are 
from Niger Delta (see South-South). The additional three states include; Ondo (South-West); 
Imo and Abia (South-East). 
 
Prebendalism a belief by politicians and elected representatives that those in power have 
every right to support, share and benefit their tribal people, religion and party loyalists with 
an appointment and contracts against the established legal procedure
1 
 
 
Chapter 1  
An Overview of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region 
1.1 Introduction 
This research critically investigated the factors that led the oil triggered environmental based 
conflict and security in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Additionally, the research 
examined the institutional and military response of the state as well as the environmental 
pollution meted out by the international oil companies (IOCs) with the support of the 
Nigerian State.  
Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region is situated in the south of the country and centres on 
the natural delta of the Niger River. It comprises nine states, which are Abia, Akwa Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Cross River, Rivers, Edo, Ondo, Imo and Delta (Oyefusi, 2010; Francis et al., 
2008).  
The Niger Delta region has a surface area of 112,000 km2 (12% of Nigeria's total surface 
area), living in 3,000 communities.  The Niger Delta has a varied culture and heritage and 
the region is based on the presence of about 40 different ethnic groups speaking 250 
languages and dialects representing one of the most densely populated regions of Africa1 
(Zabbey  and Olsson 2017; NDDC, 2004).  
All of Nigeria’s oil production takes place in the land or waters of the extended Delta region. 
It constitutes a massive oil infrastructure, including ‘5,779 oil wells, 9,717 kilometres of 
pipelines network, 126 production platforms, 16 gas plants and refineries and ten export 
                                        
1 The numerous ethnic groups include Ijaws, Ogonis, Ikwerres, Etches, Ekpeyes, Ogbas, Engennes, Obolos, 
Isoko, Nembes, Okrikans, Kalabaris, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Igbos, Ika-Igbos, Ndoni, Oron, Ibeno, and Yorubas, 
Ibibios, Annangs and Efiks. Other groups include Ibibios, Anang, Efiks, Bekwarras, Binis, etc. The heritage 
of the people is reflected in modes of dressing, marriages,traditional culture and festivals (See Niger Delta 
Regional Master Plan, NDDC, 2014). The predominant settlement type in the Niger Delta is small and scattered 
hamlets. 
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terminals, and 112 flow stations as well as over 3000 rivers and creeks, marshy and thickly 
forested swampy landscape (Watts, 2007: 639; Essien 2017). The Niger Delta region is home 
to an estimated 45 million people representing about 23 per cent of Nigeria’s population 
20182. It covers an area of about 70,000 square kilometres and is ranked among the top 10 
coastal marine ecosystems in the world (Civil Liberties Organisation, 1996; Omotola, 2006). 
The Niger Delta region is a wetland of about 70,000 square kilometres spread over some 
ecological zones; sandy coastal ridge barriers, brackish or saline mangroves, freshwater, 
swamp forest, and lowland in rain forest along the Gulf of Guinea. Niger Delta is the third 
largest wetland in the world (Omeje, 2006: 31). The Delta is a large flood plain interspersed 
with a network of creeks and tributaries that drain the River Niger into the Atlantic Ocean 
along the Gulf of Guinea. The two other states that officially constitute the Niger Delta (Abia 
and Imo) are situated in the Southeastern part of Nigeria. Also, Ondo, located in the 
Southwest but part of economic Niger Delta as a result of geographical proximity. The 
remaining six states constitute the South-South geopolitical zone (SSZ) and are inhabited by 
the so-called minority ethnic groups. Some authors have drawn distinctions between the 
official Niger Delta and the geographical Niger Delta. The oil extraction devastated the Delta 
region and community members in oil enclaves suffered the consequences of about sixty 
years of environmental hazards.  Allen (2012) argues that oil pollution from spills, oil well 
blowouts, oil ballast discharges and improper disposal of drilling mud from petroleum 
prospecting companies have resulted in a wide array of problems such as, damage to marine 
wildlife; modification of the ecosystem through species elimination and a delay in biota 
(fauna and flora) succession; and destruction in both fishery resources and farm yields. The 
Delta region has witnessed ethnic, communal and political unrest since the 1990s. In 
                                        
22 Niger Delta population is calculated by the author based on the World Population Barometres  2018 estimates 
for Nigeria, available at: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/ and 
https://pindfoundation.org/analysis-of-conflict-trends-in-the-niger-delta/accessed 24 April 2018. 
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addition, it has witnessed incessant attacks on oil installations, hostage taking and a general 
atmosphere of insecurity at both the communal and organisational levels. 
The Niger Delta region of Nigeria has abundant natural wealth, which stands in stark contrast 
to its severe environmental pollution, poverty and underdevelopment. Oil and gas are the 
second largest contributors to Nigeria’s GDP, and account for more than 80% of Nigeria’s 
foreign exchange earnings (Buhari, 2016). Over two decades, the Delta has been mired in 
conflict and violence that threatens both human security and Nigeria’s economy.       
Image 1 Map of Nigeria 
Source: NDDC (2006)  
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This study explored the politics of natural resource governance and oil-related violent 
conflicts in Nigeria, drawing examples from resource conflicts in other similar African 
countries. It will also examine the factors that cause the resource conflicts in Nigeria.      
The problems in the region are generally associated with the high level of official corruption, 
the low level of transparency and the absence of accountability. The conflicts induced 
because of natural resources kill millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa because the 
societies are ‘structurally insecure’ (Bannon & Collier 2003). The conflicts related to natural 
resources have posed serious problems for the states in Africa and the institutions of 
governance are ‘structurally unaccountable’ (Collier, 2009: 229). Africa has seven civil wars 
in the 1970s, eight in the 1980s, and fourteen in the 1990s (Collier, 1998; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2000; Michael Ross, 2013: 17-18). Most of these wars have been linked to natural 
resources in one way or another.  
Nigeria's President Muhammadu Buhari, at the London anti-corruption summit in May 2016, 
presented a paper entitled 'My plan to fight corruption in Nigeria'. In this paper, President 
Buhari argues that Nigerians never cease to ask questions. At the time of independence in 
1960, Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP)3 per capita was at US $559, while that of 
Singapore was $476. As of 2016, Singapore’s GDP has grown to $55,182, but Nigeria’s 
increased to just $3,005. The Niger Delta region holds an estimated 37 billion barrels of 
crude oil, 192 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Essien 2017,4 World Bank, 2016, Buhari, 
2016). President Buhari asks: why is Nigeria retrogressing? The answer is high-level official 
corruption at all levels of the government. Many scholars, such as Richard Auty (2000), 
Collier (1998, 2000, 2004, 2008) and others have observed that official corruption, 
                                        
3 Nigeria is Africa’s largest economy, with an estimated 2017 gross domestic product (GDP) of $ 400 billion.  
South Africa, the continent’s next largest economy, has a GDP of $ 317 billion. Nigeria constitutes 71 per 
centof West Africa’s GDP and 27 per centof the continent’s GDP. GDP per capita is $ 2,123, compared to $ 
5,588 in South Africa, so although Nigeria is classified a lower-middle-income country by the World Bank, 
poverty remains a problem, as it does for many nations in this category. An estimated 36.1 per centof the 
population live below the absolute poverty line of $ 1.90 per day (Okonjo-Iweala 2018). 
4 The Protection of National Assets and Critical Infrastructure in Nigeria (2017) ‘Policy Monitoring Dialogue 
II: Leadership, Governance and Security Challenges in Nigeria. Outcome Document. SCDDD, Abuja, Nigeria.  
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systematic in the world of the treasury, embezzlement, and fraud are all characteristics which 
exist everywhere, but that there is systematic looting in the case of Nigeria. In Nigeria, there 
is the need to tackle the cancer of corruption and bring it down to a minimum level. 
Successive Nigerian governments have simply been unable to do much against this scourge 
(Buhari, 2016). 
1.2 An Overview of Nigerian State: Crisis in the Niger Delta Region 
Nigeria is located in West Africa, and it is Africa’s most populous country ‘the current 
population of Nigeria is 194,893,793, based on the latest United Nations (2018) estimates 
and Nigeria’s population is equivalent to 2.57% of the total world population’5. 
It has a long history, with its roots in early civilisations that sprang up along the Niger River 
in 3000 BC (Crowther 1960). Nigeria shares the land borders with Chad and Niger to the 
north and Cameroon in the east, and the Republic of Benin in the west. Its coast in the south 
lies on the Gulf of Guinea in the Atlantic Ocean.  
The Nigerian state is a ‘colonialist state’ that got its independence from Great Britain on 1st 
October 1960 (Beckman 1982). The country is heterogeneous, with over 530 different ethnic 
groups; the majority ethnic group with political influence is Hausa-Fulani which constitutes 
29% of the total population. The Yoruba constitutes 20%, the Igbo 18%, the Ijaw 10%, and 
the Ibibio and Tiv represents 3.5% and 2.5% respectively. Nigeria is a large country divided 
into six geopolitical zones with an area of 923,768.64 (Adunbi, 2015:33; Kolade et. al 
20186).   
                                        
5 Available at: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeria-population/ accessed 24 April 2018. 
 
6 Nigeria is also one of Africa’s biggest economies. Furthermore, it is also a window to Africa’s ethnic and 
cultural diversity, with more than 300 language groups spread across the country’s various geo-political zones, 
see  Kolade, O., Obembe, D. and Salia, S., (2018) "Technological constraints to firm     performance: The 
moderating effects of firm linkages and cooperation", Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, Available at: https://doi.org/10.1108/JSBED-01-2018-0029 accessed 14 June 2018. 
6 
 
Natural resource wealth mismanagement among other factors has been established as the 
source of most of the conflicts in Africa (Collier 2002). Conflicts over property have always 
existed in human societies (Baechler, 2011). However, in Africa, civil conflict or civil war 
is both a tragedy and an impediment to development, affecting most of the resource’s rich 
countries. In line with the resource conflict theory, Collier & Hoeffler (2009) argue that 
many rebellions appear to be linked to the capture of natural resources: diamonds, gold and 
oil in Angola, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Nigeria 
respectively. A rebellion is somewhat analogous to three other types of organisation: protest 
movements, armies, and organised crime which is the manifest of the resources-rich African 
countries since 1990. In the Niger Delta, Ukeje (2004) argue, Since the 1990s, the Niger 
Delta became a hotbed of communal rivalries and violent protests by deprived oil 
communities against the alliance of the Nigerian State and multinational oil companies.  
In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, oil has indirectly aggravated the risk of violent conflicts 
through a further distortion of the national economy. The federal government spending more 
on defence in order to stabilize the Niger Delta region during the peak of the crisis to protect 
the critical national infrastructure and concurrently costing the human capital development 
projects, see Figure 1. 
The available evidence from Nigeria’s National Oil Spill Monitor7 suggests that there were 
incidences of vandalism with huge losses, for instance Nigeria used to produce over 2.3 
million barrels of crude oil per day which dropped to 1.9 million barrels in 2016 see Figure 
3 and 4 at pages 34-35. The Nigerian transition to democratic 
rule in 1999 decisively increased the opportunities for violent struggle in the South-South 
region, in a twofold manner: first, through the easing of political repression and, second, 
through the spread of armed youth groups, which have been fostered by corrupt politicians. 
                                        
7 Up-to-date oil spill details Oil Spill Incidence is available at: https://oilspillmonitor.ng/ accessed 03 June 
2018 
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Figure 1 Capital Expenditure  
Source: Source: Central Bank of Nigeria in Ikpe, 2017  
These incidents imply that violence in the Niger Delta is increasingly driven by the 
autonomous dynamics of an economy of violence: the involvement of security forces, 
politicians and businesspersons in illegal oil theft help to explain the perpetuation of the 
violent conflicts at a low level of intensity (Mähler 2010; Katsouris and Sayne 2013). 
Instead of using the oil revenues to eradicate poverty and provides quality life, oil has turned 
out to be a curse to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria since   it was first discovered in the 
region (Oviasuyi and Uwadiae, 2010: 2). Amnesty International, in its 2009 report, opined 
that the Niger Delta is a location that has massive oil deposits. In the region, the oil and gas 
have been extracted for decades by the government of Nigeria and its partners - the 
multinational oil companies (Amnesty International, 2009). In 1956 a new financial future 
for Nigeria began to present itself through the discovery of crude oil. Its first export took 
place in 1958 (Tamuno, 2011). The end of the Cold War witnessed a proliferation of conflicts 
in the world from ethno-religious clashes to the struggle for the control of natural resources, 
to human rights abuses and movements for self-determination. Africa in the post-Cold War 
era has witnessed violence and civil wars and inter-ethnic rivalries. The politics of 
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controlling natural resources is ‘one of the several explosive phenomena that define many 
extractive economies of the global South’ (Tar, 2008:31). Natural resources can be said to 
‘constitute a direct or remote cause of conflict; [they] sustain conflicts’ (Alao, 2007:4). Most 
of the conflicts in Africa are triggered by the sharing, ownership and use of land and 
resources. The World Bank research carried out by Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), indicates 
that developing countries are more prone to violence, civil wars and bad governance. 
According to ACLED (2018) report:  
Nigeria has high levels of political violence and protest when compared to the 
continent at large. As of 2017, Nigeria is the second most violent state in Africa, 
accounting for 10% of all weekly political conflict events across the continent.8 
 
The World Development Report, a publication by the World Bank described West Africa as 
one of the poorest, neglected and least stable regions in the world—a result of poor 
leadership. At present, 80 per cent (38 of the 48) of the least developed countries (LDCs) 
are African. Of the 16 countries in West Africa, the following 11 countries are classified as 
LDCs; Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone and Togo9. 
All but three of its 16 countries are on the United Nations (UN) list of “least developed 
countries” which are Since independence, countries in the region have experienced at least 
58 military coups, attempted coups, and many resource-induced civil wars.  Many rebel 
groups have remained active since the end of the Cold War. Where conflicts have ended, 
recovery and the creation of resilient institutions take time, and the weakness of governance 
                                        
8 ACLED asserts: The most dangerous areas in Nigeria include Borno, where Boko Haram typically operates 
and the Niger River Delta region, where political violence often occurs centered around oil. Finally, protests 
and riots challenging local and national governance practices are frequent in the south and west of the state. 
Available at: https://www.acleddata.com/dashboard/ accessed on 09 July 2018. 
 
9 See ‘Eleven West African Countries have Least Developed Countries (LDC) status’ available at: 
http://www.thewomenstorch.com/2016/12/16/eleven-west-african-countries-have-least-developed-countries-ldc-
status/ accessed 09 July 2018. 
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in post-conflict environments attracts transnational criminal networks. International drug 
traffickers began in 2004 to use the Niger Delta as a base for shipping cocaine from South 
America to Europe (World Development Report, 2011). 
In Nigeria, conflicts over oil resources generally arise over issues such as; who should have 
access to and control over resources; who can influence decisions regarding their allocation, 
the sharing of benefits, their management and their rate of use. It is pertinent to note that 
disputes and grievances over natural resources are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent 
conflict. The drivers of violence are most often multi-faceted. Disputes and grievances over 
natural resources can contribute to violent conflict when they overlap with other factors, 
such as ethnic polarisation, high levels of inequality, poverty, injustice and poor governance 
(UN Framework Team, 201210, Steward, 1998). In the context of Nigeria, the government 
policies, institutions, structures and processes at all levels governing the access, use, 
ownership and management of natural resources can be critical drivers of conflict, especially 
in the resource-abundant regions. The UN Framework Team (2012) argues that in many 
cases, an abundance of natural resources as well as grievances associated with political 
exclusion, corruption, and an unequal distribution of oil wealth are primarily responsible for 
the militarization of the resource-rich region particularly in Africa and more especially in 
Nigeria. 
Byart et. al (1999) have described the period from the 1990s onward in a title of a book as 
the “criminalization of the state in Africa”. The escalation of militancy and violence in the 
Niger Delta region because of the presence of oil in the area has created a high level of 
insecurity in Nigeria. The area has become a locus for the easy proliferation of small arms 
and light weapons into the wrong hands. Armed resistance, armed conflicts, intensive 
hostilities, militancy and criminality have become characteristic of the Nigerian state, 
threatening the security of individuals and the economic structure of the country. In Africa, 
                                        
10 UN Framework Team, 2012 available at: http://unfccc.int/2860.php accessed 28th November 2017 
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the implications of some of these conflicts have been profound, sometimes resulting in the 
collapse of state structures, massive human rights abuses, sectarian and ethnic violence, the 
weakening of civil society, the further depression of the economy, and the disintegration of 
traditional legitimate institutions. Natural resources have gained a new strategic importance 
because of the new paradigm shift in the economics of war in the post-Cold War world. 
Foreign military assistance is again on the rise due to the “war on terror,” and the withdrawal 
of Cold War foreign sponsorship in the late 1980s made the extractive economy “loot-able”: 
natural resources were the mainstay of many war economies throughout the 1990s (Le 
Billon, 2005). Ross (2012) observed that resource-related conflicts pose unique problems 
for social and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Of the seventeen resource-
related conflicts in the world in the early 2000s, nine were in Africa. And, Africa has a 
population of  1,281,705,367 as of Tuesday, April 24, 2018, equivalent to 16.64% of 
the total world population11. However, it accounts for over 60 per cent of the world's violent 
resource conflict. The African conflicts also show very worrisome trends. For instance, 
during the period from 1992 to 2001, the number of armed conflicts outside Africa dropped 
by half, but the number of conflicts in Africa stayed roughly the same (Ross, 2012). 
In the context of the Niger Delta, it has been argued that the conflict over oil is between two 
distinct actors:  those clamouring for local ownership of the oil-rich environment and the 
state; and its allies who struggle to maintain the national ownership of the natural resources. 
The local communities in the oil-bearing region are posing threats to state legitimacy through 
the formation of militant organisations in the name of freedom and environmental protection. 
Oyefusi (2010) argues that oil has a corrupting disposition, inciting civil unrest and the 
emergence of the civil militia among the youth in Nigeria's Delta region. 
                                        
11Africa Population Live (2018) available at: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-
population/ accessed 24 April 2018. 
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Traditionally, most of the people in this region are dependent on fishing and agriculture as a 
means of income-generation and living. Nigeria’s National Policy on the Environment 
(NPE) clearly stipulates environmental ethics of practice. Nigeria is “committed to a national 
policy that ensures sustainable development based on proper management of the 
environment in order to meet the needs of the present and future generations” (FEPA, 1989 
in Ajayi and Afolabi 2002:5). As confirmed by the UNEP (2011) report on the Ogoniland in 
the Niger Delta region, the environment has been vastly abused by local and international 
oil firms. The situation in the Niger Delta region has worsened due to the lack of political 
leadership to address the problem effectively. The Nigerian state appears too weak to enforce 
pertinent laws related to business, environment and development. The oil companies 
operating in Nigeria have a responsibility to manage and maintain pipelines properly, but 
they hardly do this because of the corrupt nature of the Nigerian state. By any standard, even 
if it is the youth militants that destroyed the pipelines, it is the responsibility of the oil 
companies to ensure that their pipes do not leak and pollute the environment (Allen, 2012). 
No matter who caused the leaks, the environment must be protected, but the reverse is the 
case in the Niger Delta region.  
1.3 The Aims and Objectives of the Study 
The aim of this study is to examine the nexus between environmental degradation and violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  
The specific objectives of this research project are:  
● To examine the causes of resource-based conflicts in Nigeria’s Niger Delta;  
● To examine the extent to which the nexus between the environment, conflict and 
security in the Niger Delta   have defined the issues of national and local development 
and their concerns to the Nigerian public; 
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● To discuss the responses of the government and oil companies (MNCs) to the 
demands of community with regard to environmental protection, development and 
the social security of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The major questions that the research project will come to grips are: 
1. Is the natural resource endowment in the Niger Delta a curse or blessing?  
2. Why conflicts over local and national ownership have raised in the politics of 
resource control and management in Nigeria? 
3. To what extent can the violent conflicts in the Niger Delta be attributed to Nigerian 
elite’s greed; host communities’ grievance and multi-national corporations’ (MNCs) 
exploitation of the environment in fuelling crisis in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria? 
4. Does the Nigerian case support the theory of natural resource curse? Moreover, is 
the curse the natural resources themselves, or just the poor management?  
1.5 Statement of the research objectives 
Nigeria, like most of the resource-rich developing countries, faces a myriad of challenges in 
the 21st century. The oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria affected by resource-wars where 
peace, if it does occur, can be tenuous, full of unresolved rivalries, chaos, and tensions. The 
aim of this study is to examine the nexus between environmental degradation and violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The specific objectives of this research project 
are: a) to examine the causes of resource-based conflicts in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. (b) to 
examine the extent to which the nexus between the environment, conflict and security in the 
Niger Delta   have defined the issues of national and local development and their concerns 
to the Nigerian public. (c) to discuss the responses of the government and oil companies 
(MNCs) to the demands of community with regard to environmental protection, 
development and the social security of the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. 
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 In May 2000, the front page of The Economist depicted an armed rebel embossed on a map 
of Africa; the captain asked: ‘The Hopeless Continent?’ African countries have witnessed 
prolonged civil wars and violent conflicts, mostly related to the local ownership of natural 
resources instead of collective national ownership. At the end of the Cold War, African 
countries were faced with security problems and the lowest GNP per capita. Most of the 
resource-rich developing countries are often presented as war-ridden, poverty-ravaged and 
ecologically devastated (Okonta and Douglas 2003). The frequency of natural resources 
conflicts in the Niger Delta region has declined dramatically since the declaration of 
Presidential Amnesty to the youth militants and also in the 2015 new militant group “Niger 
Delta Avengers” engaged in oil pipelines destruction and hostage-taking.  
Africa south of the Sahara (sub-Saharan Africa) is widely recognised as the most conflict-
prone region in the world. Between 1980 and 1994, nearly half of the world’s war-affected 
countries were located in Africa, and in the year 2000, two-thirds of the 100,000 people 
killed directly in armed conflicts worldwide were in Africa (Jackson, 2006). Since 1960, 
over eight million people have died either directly or indirectly because of Africa’s wars, 
more than 5.5 million of whom were civilians (Jackson 2006:16).  
Since Nigeria’s independence in October 1960, the country continued on a path of regional, 
ethnic, and resource-based conflict. Nigeria fought a tragic civil war between 1967 to 1970. 
Presently, in Nigeria, the conflict between armed civilian militias and government and 
corporate paramilitary forces in the oil-rich Niger Delta (South-South region), has been 
estimated at reducing the country’s oil production output to about 60%, plummeted to a near 
30-year low of 1.1 million mid-2016, which was just over 2 million barrels per day in the 
just past few months (Gupte 2018). This reduction is due to persistent bombing and 
disruption of oil pipelines and installations in many instances’ militants claimed 
responsibility for it. The crisis in the Niger Delta started off as a quarrel between the local 
host community and Shell Petroleum Development Company. As Kukah (2011:89) notes, 
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Shell has been involved in oil explorations in the Niger Delta for over fifty years. The Ogoni 
struggle went beyond Shell to the federal government of Nigeria. The oil bearing 
communities considered Nigerian government as the landlords of Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (SPDC) and other multinational and local oil companies operating 
in Nigeria. Additionally, in the North-eastern region, there is an insurgency by a violent 
militant jihadist (VMJ) group called Boko Haram. Since independence, Nigeria has been a 
fragile and volatile country bedevilled by ethnic, religious and political violence and 
instability (Hill 2013).  
The violent conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta region is often between rival groups, 
scrambling for their share of the proceeds of the limited oil revenues. The nature of the 
Nigerian state has, so far, blocked any attempt at unifying in a common goal toward national 
economic development and prosperity for the good of the populace. 
Nigeria is a large, complex, and heterogeneous country that combines incredible dynamism 
and promise with serious governance challenges – endemic corruption. It is by far the most 
populous country in Africa, with a population that speaks more than 500 languages (World 
Bank, 2015). 
Nigeria is vulnerable to violent conflict due to the prevalence of ethnic disunity, or what 
Barry Buzan (1999:135) calls ‘negative group unity’, environmental destruction by the oil 
companies and the persistent underdevelopment of the oil host communities. Also, the 
minority groups always complain of political domination by the majority ethnic groups. The 
different sizes of groups relative to the national arena, and the extent to which different 
identities (ethnic, regional, religious, class, among other things) overlap with, or crosscut, 
each other (see Fearon and Laitin 1996; Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004; Weingast 1997).  
Prebendalism and ethnic jingoism are caused by the members of the dominant ethnic groups 
(Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo); Hausa/Fulani is accused of dominating Nigerian politics 
and marginalising other ethnic groups from key positions since independence. The 
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domination of politics by the Hausa/Fulani is due to their numerical strength. Political power 
is used to obstruct policy and economic reforms that could interfere with the dominant ethnic 
group’s control over the country’s natural resources. This has manifested itself in the 
everyday politics of Nigeria. At any given time, the ethnic group that controls the national 
leadership uses political or military means to foster divisions within and between minority 
ethnic groups. Competition for limited resources between these ethnic groups has also led to 
a divisive political landscape. For example, the Ogoni, a minority ethnic group in their 
famous declaration tagged ‘Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR), worth quoting at length, affirm: 
In the past years (since independence in 1960) the majority ethnic groups of Nigeria. 
They have not only been usurped; they have been misused and abused, turning Nigeria 
into a hell on earth for the Ogoni and similar ethnic minorities. (Since) Nigerian 
independence has done no more than outline the wretched quality of the leadership of 
the Nigerian majority ethnic groups and their cruelty as they have plunged the nation 
into ethnic strife, carnage, war, dictatorship, retrogression and the greatest waste of 
national resources ever witnessed in world history, turning generations of Nigerians, 
born and unborn into perpetual debtors (Ogoni Bill of Rights, 1990:6). 
 
 Added to the despoliation of the environment is the claims over the local ownership of 
natural resources in Niger Delta that led to the formation of militant groups that ensued 
fighting between the state and non-state actors. According to Kukah ‘the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights (OBR), was a declaration of war by other means, a non-violent war against the 
injustice of the Nigerian state’ against the local people (Kukah 2011:112). Also, corruption 
and lack of political structures and functioning institutions in Nigeria among other things 
contributed to the crisis in the Niger Delta. The amalgamation of North and South 
protectorates in 1914 to form a single colony named Nigeria created resentment among 
marginalised minority ethnic groups, which are dominated by the majority. However, Fearon 
and Laitin (2003:75) argue that ‘a greater degree of ethnic or religious diversity by itself” is 
not ‘a major and direct cause’ of violent conflict.  The violent conflict is associated mostly 
with ‘conditions that favour insurgency,’ including ‘poverty, which marks financially and 
bureaucratically weak states’ (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 75). The communities of the oil-rich 
Niger Delta always complain of the chronic poverty resulting from the pollution of their 
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farmland by the oil companies’ activities which makes them incapable of meeting their daily 
livelihood. 
In the Niger Delta, the Ogoni and Ijaw people for many years experienced marginalisation 
and turned to non-violence campaign for the return of their territory, land and resources to 
be owned by the local communities against the national ownership as outlined in the Kaiama 
Declarations and Ogoni Bill of Rights proclamations respectively. On 3rd of November 
1992, under the leadership of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Movement for Survival of the Ogoni 
People (henceforth, MOSOP), the MOSOP organized the Ogoni people peacefully 
demonstrated and issued a notice to the oil companies operating in the region. If the Ogonis 
are peaceful why did they give notice to the oil companies to suspend their activities? Ogoni 
people, in particular, and the Niger Delta people, in general, have struggled against the 
degradation of their lands by Shell and its subsidiaries in Nigeria. The MOSOP demanded 
the oil companies pay rents, royalties, and compensation for the devastated land, or leave 
the Ogoni land where about 40% of Nigeria’s current natural resources are exploited and 
extracted. The Ogoni protest drew the attention of international human rights and 
environmental organizations. The protest and the subsequent shutdown of the oil companies’ 
activities seemingly signalled the starting point of protest and grievance against the 
government and the oil companies in Nigeria. The MOSOP well-coordinated and organized 
protest has led to a lack of trust between the oil host communities and the multinational oil 
companies backed by the federal government of Nigeria. This situation puts each ethnic 
group at risk and makes it difficult to agree on policies that foster economic development. 
Most Nigerians do not view their government from a democratic standpoint. In Nigeria, to 
most people, the act of governance has been seen or defined by sentiments based on tribal, 
regional and religious loyalty ‘my loyalty to my tribe and region not to the Nigerian state’ 
because some Nigerians view the national government as unrepresentative and 
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undemocratic. The crisis in the Niger Delta is rooted in regional loyalty and natural resources 
nationalism.     
The primary source of revenue for the Nigerian government is from oil rent. This income 
maintains the power base of the country, and the state can use coercive force to retain the 
ownership of the natural resources by the government, not an individual, region or tribes.  
Since the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1958, Nigeria's traditional sources of 
revenue, including agriculture and industrial activities, have collapsed. The presence of 
natural resource wealth coexisting with poor levels of economic growth is a recognized 
pattern among economists. It is called the 'Dutch Disease' after an early manifestation; the 
argument is that paradoxically natural resource wealth leads to economic problems as the 
focus on general economic development is lost (Collier 2011). Nigeria’s leadership has 
resisted or not pursued diversification of the economy.  In turn, economic stagnation and 
division have hindered the country from being able to deliver good governance. The elite 
views economic reform as not needed because the country is earning enough money from 
oil royalties. In the opinion, Okonjo-Iweala Nigeria’s former finance minister said: 
“Nigeria's oil and gas sector is yet to witness effective reforms to enhance its global 
competitiveness and reflect the current realities in world energy dynamics”. Nigeria’s 
economy is highly dependent on oil, accounting for over 90 per cent of exports and 70 per 
cent of government revenues. The country, a member of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), was the fifteenth-largest oil producer in the world in 2016. It 
has the eleventh-largest oil reserves and ninth-largest natural gas reserves. Nigeria’s natural 
resource wealth has not served its population as well as it should because certain key 
institutions remain weak or non-existent and a small kleptocratic ruling elite has perpetuated 
and taken advantage of this vacuum. But the country has had periods of good growth and 
reasonable economic performance (Okonjo-Iweala 2018). 
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Instead, attempts have never been made to address economic reform and the difficult 
problems that would come with it, that is, to invest the windfall gains of oil revenue and 
instead have been happy to squander the revenue on patronage, wastage, ‘white elephant’ 
projects, and other unproductive activities to control power. The majority of the citizens do 
not pay tax, and as a result, the citizens are not demanding accountability from their leaders.  
Based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria, this research makes the case that bad governance 
and negative group’s unity within the Nigerian federation has contributed to the resource-
based conflict. The Niger Delta oil host communities are complaining about the way the oil-
mining license or what is popularly called in Nigeria “oil block” have been allocated by 
people in power to their cronies, relatives and business partners (Field interviews, Eleme, 
December 2016). Both the armed militants and environmental youth vanguards, the elders 
and the traditional community leaders, are unhappy that people from the Northern region of 
the country owned most of the oil blocks.   
The Niger Delta communities complain of marginalisation and injustice and made prisoners 
of out-siders interests in their own lands. The leaders at the state and local government levels 
are not helping; they are benefiting themselves instead of creating collective public goods 
for social and economic development aimed at ending poverty and destitution in the region. 
The Niger Delta people and Nigerian people, in general, would not be poor if there were 
good governance and social justice to allocate the scarce resources evenly “governance has 
become both a private and a communal enterprise in Nigeria” (Adunbi 2015:63). The Dutch 
problems suggest that there is no simple way to fix this. The aim of this study is to examine 
the nexus between environmental degradation and violent conflict in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria.  
The aim of this research is to examine the causes of resource-based conflicts in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta. The primary research question is in what ways do natural resources contribute 
to conflicts in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region?  
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The question has established an increased understanding of the nature of resource conflict 
in Nigeria by examining the nexus between the central government, oil companies and 
communities. The findings of the research suggest that the destruction of the environment 
due to oil exploration and exploitation generates conflict in the oil-rich region of Nigeria. 
1.6 Justification for this Study 
The politics of the environment, conflict, and security nexus are the primary determinant 
factors that can propel the future prospects of Africa’s most populous nation – Nigeria. In 
Nigeria, climbing to political power is inextricably linked to accessing the country’s cheap 
money or lucrative oil revenue for a get rich-quick scheme. Politics, both local and 
international, are constructed in terms of power. Although the term 'power politics' has 
unsavoury connotations for some, such a definition implies that the term is redundant12 
(Baldwin, 2012). From the perspective of the realist school of thought, all politics are power 
politics in the sense that all politics involve power. This is not to say that politics are 
exclusively about power. It is imperative that the access to political power is one of the main 
subjects of research in political science and international relations. Violent conflict and 
instability in Nigeria, or in any given society, can be succinctly explained with political 
science and international relations theories. In the context of the Niger Delta region, the 
violent-conflict of interest, propelled by greed regarding how the distribution of oil wealth 
should be shared between the oil producing states and non-oil producing states, results in 
insecurity in the region. The Niger Delta conflict is all about who gets what, when and how 
in politics13. Oil and gas extractions in the Niger Delta contribute to insecurity and 
environmental destruction due to the following reasons. 
                                        
12 Baldwin, D. (2012) Power and International Relations, Available at: 
http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20(2012)%20Power%20and%20Internat
ional%20Relations.pdf Accessed 06 March 2017 
 
13 Harold Lasswell (1994) defines politics as ‘who get what, when and how’. “Politics” as a term should not 
be limited to any one set of activities, but should be applied to a class of human behaviours that have a common 
purpose. 
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First, the exploitation and extraction of oil and gas, from an economic development and 
security perspective, indicates that there are contradictions and inconsistencies that this 
research seeks to explore within the framework of development discourse. Second, this 
research aims to explore and examine the thoughts of people in the Niger Delta, especially 
the communities in which oil and gas has been discovered, as well as communities without 
natural resources in their immediate environment, by conducting in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions. The interviews were not only held with the host communities, but 
also with the policy makers and the actors in the oil and gas industry to find out   the exact 
cause of conflict in the Niger Delta. Thirdly, this research aims to contribute to the debates 
on what has prompted the militancy, as well as clarify the reason why, despite the oil 
producing states having more access to the natural resource wealth and special development 
agencies, there are still grievances from the oil host communities. This research makes a 
review of literature from similar conflicts prompted by the natural resources in the 
developing countries.  
This research considered the following factors to answer what the causes of the natural 
resource conflict in the Niger Delta region are. 
First, one of the causes for violent armed militia and conflict is the issue of poor natural 
resource governance as the result of institutional failures ‘Nigeria has been less than 
fortunate in its leadership’ (Achebe 1983) ‘forever-fragile’ since independence (Hills 2013). 
The poor management of the Niger Delta environment is due to neglectful environmental 
pollution laws, rules, and sub-standard inspection techniques posed by the federal 
government14. This has led to the destruction of the environment, turning the oil producing 
land uninhabitable, with a greater degree of danger to human life due to the chemicals and 
                                        
14 Field interviews with George Chama, Ministry of Environment, Rivers State, Nigeria on 13 February 2017 
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waste. The oil companies pollute, and corrupt government officials hide15. This research 
reveals that the federal government and the multinational oil companies did not do well in 
protecting the environment and ecology from degradation, as such committing 
environmental terrorism in the Niger Delta, especially to Ogoni people. Shell Petroleum 
Company is referred to as ‘hell’ because its presence in the region destroyed the ecosystem 
with greater impact on human health (UNEP 2011).  
Second, this research reveals the issue of uncontrolled waste, corruption, and 
mismanagement of the natural resources hugely contributed to the conflict in the Niger 
Delta. Nigeria depends on oil and gas as a source of profit. Despite Nigeria’s wealth, more 
than 80% of the population lives on less than two dollars a day with poor life quality16. Since 
independence in 1960, Nigeria has earned billions of United States dollars from crude oil 
export. Global Witness (2017) argue that an estimated US $400 billion in oil revenues has 
gone missing from Nigerian state coffers as the result of corruption and poor failed 
institutions.  
Accordingly, Collier (2004) argues, there is a link between natural resources and conflict 
due to greed. Collier also notes that corruption and poor governance raises the risk of conflict 
in resource rich developing countries. Thus, there is a link between a country’s natural 
resources and risk of conflict, which results in poor economic growth, finance, victory honey 
pots, and poor governance (see Collier 2009, 2002; 2008; 2004; 2011). The World Bank also 
notes: "economic mismanagement, corruption, and excessive dependence on oil have been 
the main reasons for the poor economic performance and rising poverty” (World Bank, 
                                        
15 Nkojoko field interviews on the 26 January 2017, at the traditional ruler’s Palace, Rivers State 
 
16 Global Witness (2017) ‘Nigeria’. In 2011, Global Witness revealed how two of the world’s biggest 
companies, Shell and Italy’s Eni, paid $1.1 billion for Nigerian oil block "OPL 245" to the government. The 
money ended up with a front company owned by former Nigerian oil minister, Dan Etete. Etete had effectively 
awarded the block to himself when in power and was cashing in on his corruption. The US $1.1 billion can 
help a lot of people in Nigeria. But, the Nigerian people saw none of this money, as it was diverted to Etete 
and a string of middlemen and anonymous companies. Available at: 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/countries/nigeria/#more 08 May 2017. 
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2015). The oil-producing areas in the Niger Delta have deteriorated since the early 1990s. 
The government has routinely ignored concerns by local communities that are not benefiting 
from oil wealth and withstand the worst of the industry's environmental damage, or what 
Saro-Wiwa (1995) describes as the emerging ‘ecological war’. 
Third, there is lack of transparency and accountability in Nigeria, both the private and public 
sectors are not sincere enough. In Nigeria, the government deals with all matters of public 
expenditure secretly. The public are not allowed to know how much oil revenue is allocated 
at local and state levels. People in power are operating in a personalized way. Oil-funded 
governments are not financed by public taxes. There is also secrecy surrounding petroleum 
revenues, whereby governments conceal transactions, and use their own national oil 
companies to hide both revenues and expenditure. 
Lastly, agencies such as the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the 13% 
special allocation to the oil producing states of the Niger Delta region have failed to meet 
the host communities’ developmental demands. The agencies were created to provide 
infrastructural development projects such as; roads, electricity, schools, clinics/health care 
facilities, clean drinking water, as well as skill acquisition centres, and youth and women 
empowerment, but nothing has transpired. In Nigeria, not only has the government failed in 
its responsibilities, but also the multinational oil companies have failed to undertake their 
corporate social responsibilities, especially in the Niger Delta region. 
1.7 Ethical Issues 
In order to explore the reality in the Niger Delta, my research was guided by the principle of 
anonymity and impartiality. The interviews were conducted through reliable sources 
(traditional rulers, serving government officials, activist and former political leaders). In 
other words, they were genuine people who had witnessed the environmental impact of oil 
exploration, militancy, and government security reactions in the Niger Delta region, and 
could give an accurate account of what really happened during 2010 to 2017.  
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I was able to interview two ex-militants, but the Nigerian Army refused to respond to my 
questions and asked me to receive approval from the Defence Headquarters in Abuja - 
Nigeria’s seat of power. I interviewed six traditional rulers and some community chiefs in 
the Ogoniland, which helped me to understand the origins of the violent conflict in the Niger 
Delta. One of the aims of this research is to explore the factors for the environment 
exploitation, conflict, and security in the Niger Delta into empirical material. This study aims 
to show that the research is not as complicated, either or ethically, as it is politically sensitive. 
Both for in-depth and focus group interviews, the following categories of people were 
selected and interviewed; government officials; community/NGOs leaders; oil companies’ 
officials; traditional rulers, youth activists and student union leaders.  
The ethical issues involved in qualitative research in a conflict environment are many. Most 
of the problems were overcome by protecting the participants. The research was guided by 
the research ethics code of conduct, or what Orb et. al described thus:  
The difficulties inherent in qualitative research can be alleviated by awareness and 
use of well-established ethical principles; specifically, autonomy, beneficence, and 
justice. Ethical issues that surround conducting research in conflict settings and 
sensitive political environments are numerous (Orb and Wynaden, 2000).17. 
 
 Niger Delta is potentially a dangerous region for research and the issues of personal safety 
were of paramount importance throughout my stay in the region while conducting my 
fieldwork research. I did most of the interviews with government officials at their offices. 
Also, the interviews were in a public place such as the local government secretariat, 
traditional palaces and meeting a working person during the lunch break rather than at home 
in the evening. Interestingly, most of the interviewees invited me to their office to do the 
interviews. 
                                        
17 Orb, E.L. and Wynaden, D (2000) Ethics in Qualitative Research. Available at: 
http://www.columbia.edu/~mvp19/RMC/M5/QualEthics.pdf accessed 27 March 2017. 
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I also reflected carefully on the fact that I am from northern Nigeria and knowing that the 
Niger Delta people (some) have grievances against the North as a region. Therefore, as a 
northerner, I refused to engage in any regional or tribal conversations. I also avoided 
engaging in discussing the local political issues; I acted neutrally as a researcher in line with 
the ethical practice code for doing research in a potentially sensitive region. 
I was aware of the complex nature of the Niger Delta security issues, reflecting my 
experience during my National Service in 2006 - 2007 in Rivers State. During the period, I 
have witnessed the most challenging insecurity of my life such as the Boko Haram 
insurgency activities in my home state of Borno. The first day, I arrived at Port Harcourt 
City in the Niger Delta, I reported to the State Commissioner of Police and explained my 
mission; that I was a researcher and wanted to do   fieldwork on the nexus between the 
environment, conflict and security in the Niger Delta region. I was accorded all necessary 
support. The Acting Commissioner of Police always monitored my movements and advised 
me of where to go and where not to go. On one occasion, the Niger Delta youth in Bori and 
Eleme towns were asking me to visit some communities to see the level of environmental 
pollution and destruction meted on the environment by oil companies’ activities. As usual, 
I contacted the Police Commissioner for security advice as to whether I should travel to 
creeks or not, the police chief advised me not to travel to the riverine areas. I respectfully 
obliged. I always shared my location live (using smart phone share location) with my family 
members and the police officer   during my stays in the Niger Delta region. 
Knowing the volatile nature of   Nigeria’s Niger Delta region for research, personal safety 
was of paramount importance throughout my stay in the region while conducting the 
fieldwork interviews. The University Risk Assessment Form (RAF) and the ethics Code of 
Practice of LSBU clearly indicated how to carry out research in the volatile areas, I employed 
all strategies for handling risk situations in the risky environment, such as; Port Harcourt 
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City, Eleme, Bori, Khana and Okrika in the Niger Delta region. I considered the appropriate 
venues safe for the interviews. 
Accordingly, before I travelled to Nigeria’s Niger Delta region I applied to the University 
Ethics Committee (UEC) for approval and I was granted approval to conduct research on the 
14th September 2016, refer to the attached ‘Ethics approval letter’ (appendix 1). 
1.8 The Importance of this Study  
This study examined, identified and analysed factors responsible for instability and violent 
conflict in Nigeria, with a particular focus on the Niger Delta region. This study differs from 
previous research because it argues that the resource curse alone cannot explain the conflict 
in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.  
The study also looks at the issues of environmental destruction, armed youth militant groups, 
and struggles over the local ownership of the oil-rich environment in the Niger Delta. 
Temuno (2011) calls this 'communities, corporations and country,' while I call it, 
communities, companies and conflict in the Niger Delta. The findings of this research will 
address the issues of natural resource governance in Nigeria and could be applicable to other 
resource-rich countries in the developing regions of the world. Second, this study aims to 
take a critical look at the on-going environmental remediation and the presidential amnesty 
programme in the Niger Delta. Third, an attempt has been made to reconcile the overarching 
issues of environment, conflict, and security in the Niger Delta. Fourth, the thesis will 
critically examine the presidential amnesty programme to the repentant militants in order to 
bring peace to the restive Niger Delta. In order to make oil exploration flow unhindered, 
some of the oil companies hired local groups to protect pipelines and oil wells through what 
is called ‘youth president’ once the payments stopped, militancy would probably resume 
overnight (The Economist 2015).  
Countries rich in natural resources, especially oil and gas, if socially and politically well 
constituted society, would have used the wealth judiciously for social and economic 
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development; however, the natural resources have been a curse in Nigeria.  The export of 
crude oil has brought significant insecurity and environmental liabilities to the Niger Delta 
environment. In the region, the impacts and consequences of oil necessitate a comparison of 
economic gains and related social, economic, security, and environmental costs. The 
comparison becomes more meaningful and appropriate at the local community level where 
the problems of poverty, unemployment, and lack of public infrastructure fuel insurgency in 
the midst of massive wealth. The environment, conflict, and security have significant 
impacts on biodiversity and food security in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Oil 
exploration and extraction in the Niger Delta has resulted in the destruction of the 
environment due to oil spillage. This poses a serious threat to the survival of many species 
and the well-being of people in Nigeria. The study becomes vital to address the multifaceted 
environmental, development and security challenges in which most resources-endowed 
states in Africa are entrapped. The study will give us an insight into the implications of 
environmental pollution, conflict and security at regional and national contexts. 
My research investigated and identified the missing knowledge or gaps in understanding the 
linkages between environment and security in Nigeria. The research also presented criticism 
some of the baseline theories that have defined African conflicts for so many years without 
meaningful suggestions on how to address the intractable menace. This research proffered a 
model to address the conflicts in the resource-rich countries, especially in Africa from an 
African perspective. 
1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the politics of natural resources conflict in Nigeria at the introductory 
level and delved into detailed discussion of oil conflict in the Niger Delta. The chapter also 
identified and analysed factors responsible for instability and violent conflict in Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta region with similar examples from the resources endowed nations of the 
developing world. The study differs from previous research because it argues that the 
27 
 
resource curse alone cannot explain the conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta; which has been 
presented in the subsequent chapters.   
1.10 Thesis Outline 
The thesis has been broken down into seven chapters. 
In chapter 1, I presented an over overview of the research topic and the discussed the factors 
that led the oil triggered environmental based conflict and security in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria. The chapter also examined natural resource and violent conflicts in Nigeria, 
drawing examples from resource conflicts in other similar African countries. 
The chapter also presented the research aim, research question, important and justification 
of the research. 
Chapter 2 examines the roles of various stakeholders in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
The chapter also analyses three perspectives in understanding the Niger Delta, the Federal 
Government, the multinational oil companies and the armed militants in the oil conflict 
including the federal government amnesty to the militants. I explored the way oil host 
communities cooperate with the militant groups and NGOs to claim the ownership of the 
oil-rich environment and subsequent responses of the Nigerian government to grant 
presidential amnesty to the militants challenging the state legitimacy over ownership and 
control of the oil exploitation and exploration. 
Chapter 3 identified and discussed relevant scholarly arguments, and attempts has been made 
to establish a relationship between the extractive economies, (oil and gas), and conflicts, and 
the environment and security in the developing world with particular reference to the Niger 
Delta case study. Who are the main actors in the Niger Delta environmental and oil conflicts? 
In what ways do oil trigger conflict and insecurity in the Niger Delta? To address the research 
questions, the chapter presented reviewed scholarly work on natural resources, environment 
and conflict. The chapter traces the antecedents of the resource conflicts debates from a 
global, regional, and local context. After reviewing various theories of natural resources and 
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development. The chapter further considered some scholarly criticism on some of the 
famous theories (greed versus grievance) and seeks to establish which of the theory or 
theories that best explain the Nigeria resources conflict experience. 
Chapter 4 discusses the methodological aspect of the thesis from ethics approval to the 
journey in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria for data collection. In details, the chapter 
presented all the processes involves in the course of gathering data and the methods used in 
the recording, transcription, as well as coding and analysis of the data. The chapter also 
highlighted the difficulties faced in securing interviews in the potentially sensitive topic in 
the Niger Delta region. Ethical issues also addressed.  
Chapter 5 presented the analysis from the field. The chapter examines and evaluates the 
politics surrounding the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. The section analysed some 
interesting results on the following themes; oil spill and degradation of the environment; the 
efforts of Niger Delta environmental vanguards; the performances of the Niger Delta 
Development Commission and the ministry of Niger Delta Affairs. Also, the chapter 
presents a thorough analysis of the current situation in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, 
especially the long-awaited cleaning of the devastated environment.  
Chapter 6 discusses the research findings, relates the findings with the research questions, 
and examined some scholarly knowledge in the field. 
Chapter 7 the chapter also examined the existing knowledge in the field of environment, 
conflict, security and development and supported the data from the field. summarized the 
research findings and the thesis contributions to the knowledge of understanding the Niger 
Delta crisis. The chapter also traces the role of the international oil companies and the 
government of Nigeria’s special agencies that mostly failed in addressing the developmental 
needs and demands of the Niger Delta people.  
Chapter also presented the summary of the research work and its contributions to the 
knowledge of understanding the natural resource conflict in Nigeria. The chapter presented 
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a three main areas which the research might have contributed to knowledge; theory, 
empirical data and policy aspect.  These form the basis of recommendations for further 
researchers 
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Chapter 2 
The Environment, Conflict and Security in the Niger Delta 
2.1 Introduction 
You can never, never defeat Shell in a Nigerian court. A case can 
go on for very many years. You can hardly get a judgment against 
[an oil company] in Nigeria. Shell is Nigeria and Nigeria is Shell.  
 
His Royal Highness Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi18, December 2016. 
 
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 1 examines the roles of various 
stakeholders in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The chapter also analyses three 
perspectives in understanding the Niger Delta, viz; the Federal Government, the 
multinational oil companies and the armed militants in the oil conflict including the federal 
government amnesty to the militants. I explored the way oil host communities cooperate 
with the militant groups and NGOs to claim the ownership of the oil rich environment and 
subsequent responses of the Nigerian government to grant presidential amnesty to the 
militants challenging the state legitimacy over ownership and control of the oil exploitation 
and exploration. 
2.2 Major Actors in the Niger Delta Conflicts  
Understanding the actors in the Niger Delta conflict is a crucial factor for the better 
understanding of different narratives that run through the Nigerian State and its allies 
(MNCs) and the armed militants supported by the host communities or the inhabitants of the 
Niger Delta region19.  
                                        
18 His Royal Highness Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi is the paramount ruler and hereditary king of the Ogale 
community in the oil-rich Niger delta. See: ‘Ogoni king: Shell oil is killing my people’ available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/03/ogoni-king-shell-oil-is-killing-my-people retrieved 05 April 
2017. 
 
19 Conflict in the Niger Delta region is primarily an oil-related conflict due to either the greed or grievances, 
and or both which this thesis will hope to investigate. 
 
31 
 
This chapter aims to identify and discuss the actors that determine the politics of natural 
resources governance and conflicts in the Niger Delta. Who are the actors in the conflict? 
There are three major actors in the conflict. First, is the federal government and its coercive 
force struggling to maintain national ownership of the oil, environment and the ecosystem? 
Second are the multinational oil companies (commercial exploiters), supported by the 
federal government of Nigeria to extract oil in the region. Third are the Niger Delta armed 
youth groups referred to as the Niger Delta militants, supported by the inhabitants of the 
region struggling for the local ownership of the oil rich environment. The militants are 
challenging the nature of how the MNCs polluted the environment, ‘eco-terrorism’ and the 
politics of the sharing of natural resource wealth among the tiers of government in Nigeria. 
During the field interviews, the traditional ruler, Mr MX2, said ‘the local oil companies in 
the Niger Delta conspire with unemployed youths to vandalise the oil pipelines so that the 
MNOC will award the contract to the indigenous oil servicing companies to repairs the 
vandalized pipes’20. 
The people of the Niger Delta are not happy with how the oil wealth or oil money have been 
shared across the states and local governments in the country. The conflict between resource 
exploitation and the environment constitutes some of the key causative factors for conflict 
between the state and community, and security therefore becomes a major problem (Porto, 
2002). This chapter examines the perspectives of different stakeholders and actors involved 
in the   Niger Delta conflict and security management. The actors whose perspective will be 
critically examined are: (1) The Federal Government of Nigeria Perspective (2) The 
multinational oil companies (MNCs) Perspective (3) The armed militants Perspective. 
Finally, the chapter will discuss the reflection from the fieldwork in chapters 5 and 6. I 
proposes the following typology showing the actors in the Nigeria’s oil conflict. 
                                        
20 Mr MX2 is a traditional ruler in the Niger Delta, I had conducted series of interviews in his Palace. In fact, 
Chief Nkpe awarded me with an honorary citizenship of Eleme which I mentioned earlier. 
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Figure 2 Actors in the Niger Delta conflict 
 
2.3 The Oil Companies in the Niger Delta 
Since the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the Niger Delta region by Shell 
D’Archy in 1956 (Tamuno 2011; Adunbi 2015), the region became a new darling for the 
international oil investors and companies for the exploration and export of the oil. The oil 
companies are paying royalties to the consolidated federation account under the supervision 
of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); oil is one of the lucrative businesses 
in Nigeria. Since the conflict started, the country witnessed mass proliferation of the 
multinational oil companies’ investors into the Niger Delta region for Joint Venture (JV)21 
business between the federal government of Nigeria and the commercial oil exploiters. 
                                       
21Joint Venture (JV) is a business enterprise created and or managed by two or more parties. The federal 
government of Nigeria through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and MNCs are managing the 
exploration of the country’s oil through joint venture based on the allocated shares. 
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Following Nigeria’s return to democratic governance in 1999, the country generated a 
revenue of over one trillion US Dollars from the Niger Delta crude oil extraction. See table 
of figures 3, 4 and 5, adopted from the United States Energy Information Administration, 
December 2017. 
 
Figure 3 Crude oil production volume 
Adapted from OPEC and US EIA 2017 
 
 
Figure 4 Crude oil prices 1999 - 2016 
Adapted from OPEC and US EIA 2017 
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Table of figures 3 and 4 above, presented Nigeria’s crude oil revenues year and prices time 
series. Nigeria generated a huge revenue between 2011 – 2014 the prices of crude oil reached 
its peak US $102 – $116 per barrel. Accordingly, in the year 2015 and 2016 a barrel of crude 
oil stands at the rate of US $48 – $58.  
Table 5 below also showing the time series, volume of crude oil exported and the total 
revenues Nigeria generated from the export of crude oil. Over the period of 16 years the 
country generated US $1.0141 billion US dollars (excluding locally refined oil and gas and 
other taxes), ‘yet the country borrowed abroad unwisely and unsustainably, accumulating up 
to US $70.92 billion, there is US $18.9 billion in external debt as of March 201822. A prime 
example is provided by the Ajaokuta Steel Mills, where an investment of more than US $ 5 
billion yielded no returns to the economy’ (Okonjo-Iweala 2012:11). A significant part of 
the resources disappeared into the hands of top-level and middle-level public officials and 
politicians, most of it ending up outside Nigeria, deposited in foreign bank accounts or used 
to buy or invest in foreign assets in Europe and North America (see Giuliani 2015, Global 
Witness 2017, and Okonjo-Iweala 2012).  
The oil revenue and borrowed money most of it were wasted on “white elephant” projects. 
If these monies were invested in much-needed infrastructure, education, and health services 
it would go in long way making life better for millions of Nigerian people, these are some 
of the reasons why Nigeria’s president described corruption as a ‘cancer’ (Buhari 2016:1).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
22 Debt Management Office (2018) ‘Nigeria’s External Debt Stock’ available at: http://www.dmo.gov.ng/debt-
profile/external-debts/external-debt-stock/2375-nigeria-s-external-debt-stock-as-at-december-31-2017/file 
accessed 29 April 2018. 
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Year Price Per Barrel Barrel Per Day Total Barrel Per Year Revenue in US Dollars 
2016 48.11 1,919,000 700,465,000 33,697,927,850 
2015 54.7 2,216,000 808,840,000 44,243,548,000 
2014 102.16 2,397,000 874,905,000 89,380,294,800 
2013 112.87 2,357,000 860,305,000 97,102,625,350 
2012 116.88 2,507,000 915,055,000 106,951,628,400 
2011 116.43 2,524,000 921,260,000 107,262,301,800 
2010 83.14 2,458,000 897,170,000 74,590,713,800 
2009 68.01 2,208,000 805,920,000 54,810,619,200 
2008 104.83 2,165,000 790,225,000 82,839,286,750 
2007 78.01 2,350,000 857,750,000 66,913,077,500 
2006 68.26 2,440,000 890,600,000 60,792,356,000 
2005 57.55 2,627,000 958,855,000 55,182,105,250 
2004 40.95 2,329,000 850,085,000 34,810,980,750 
2003 31.07 2,275,000 830,375,000 25,799,751,250 
2002 26.45 2,118,000 773,070,000 20,447,701,500 
2001 26.55 2,256,000 823,440,000 21,862,332,000 
2000 30.04 2,165,000 790,225,000 23,738,359,000 
1999 17.63 2,130,000 777,450,000 13,706,443,500 
Total   15,125,995,000          1,0141,321,000:00 
 
 
Figure 5  Crude oil revenue 1999 - 2016 
Note: adapted from OPEC and US EIA 
 
 
2.3.1 The Environment 
This section will discuss the environmental despoliation meted on the environment resulted 
in the destruction of farmland (gas flaring and oil spills) and the ecosystem due to the 
increased activities of oil exploration. The oil companies’ activities has vastly affected the 
Niger Delta environment, since the beginning of oil exploration in commercial quantities in 
1958. The Niger Delta environment, especially the Ogoniland and Oloibiri, are presented as 
one of the most devastated and exploited environments on the planet (see Okonta and 
Douglas 2003). The chapter also analyses the United Nation's Environment Programme 
special report on the Ogoniland, published in 2011 and the subsequent efforts by the federal 
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government of Nigeria and the multinational oil companies to mediate or clean up the 
Ogoniland. The federal government of Nigeria has employed several environmental friendly 
techniques in the Niger Delta to address hydrocarbon contamination with little or no success 
due to the non-implementation associated with official corruption and misplacement of 
priorities as well as trained manpower. The (UNEP, 2011) report observed that it will take 
thirty years to clean-up the Ogoniland. Only Ogoniland! The Ogoniland clean-up 
necessitated by the reality on the ground which I shall discuss in chapters 5 and 6 
respectively. 
The Niger Delta environment has suffered damage during the militants’ violent conflict with 
the Nigerian security forces, especially from the recent destabilization and the setting fire to 
the oil pipelines. The Niger Delta’s new militant group, “Avengers”, blew up the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) crude and gas pipelines. The militants destroyed 
Well D25 in Abiteye, a major gas well belonging to Chevron and blew up major pipelines 
that effectively put the Abiteye, Alero, Dibi, Otunana and Makaraba flow stations that feed 
the Chevron tank farm out of operation. They also blew up the Brass to Tebidaba Crude oil 
line in Bayelsa State. The Avengers militants reduced the operations of the oil giant company 
Chevron in the Niger Delta to zero.  The Niger Delta Avengers issued a strong warning to 
international oil companies that they would make them suffer, as they have made the people 
of Niger Delta suffer over the years from environmental degradation and environment 
pollution. The Avengers demanded that the United Nations free the people of the Niger Delta 
from environmental pollution, slavery, and oppression. The exploration of oil in the region 
by the MNCs has had a deleterious effect on the well-being of the oil-bearing communities.  
The Niger Delta people have been forced to live with the highly polluted environment; the 
result of practices that would not be allowed anywhere in Europe, Canada or United States. 
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2.3:2 Oil Spills Threatened Environment 
The Niger Delta is the world’s most threatened human ecosystem (Okonta and Douglas, 
2003, UNEP, 2011). As the result of the popular demand and protest by the oil communities 
over the oil spills in the Niger Delta, due to neglect and careless handling of the oil wealth 
by the oil extracting companies, the federal government of Nigeria established a special 
agency to monitor, report oil spills and take clean-up measures.  
The National Oil Spill Detection Response Agency (NOSDRA) was established in 2006 as 
a government institutional framework to co-ordinate the implementation of the National Oil 
Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP) for Nigeria in accordance with the global practice. 
Nigeria’s NOSCP was established in-line with the principles guiding and regulating the 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) 
to which Nigeria is a signatory23. Since the organization’s establishment, it has been 
intensely occupied, in strict compliance with environmental legislation in Nigeria and the 
United Environment Programme and other international environmental treaties and pacts, 
with saving Mother Earth. The Agency embarked on Joint Investigation Visits (JIV) to the 
polluted areas to ensure the remediation of impacted sites, to monitor oil spill drill exercises 
and facilities inspection and to make recommendations for immediate clean-up. 
Gas flaring aside, oil spillage is another primary cause of environmental pollution in the 
Niger Delta. The UNDP (2006:20) studies found that ‘a total of 1,100,000 barrels of oil was 
spilled in the Niger Delta between 1979 and 2005’. Information analysis undertaken at 
Amnesty International (2015) indicates that the Royal Dutch Shell and the Italian 
multinational oil giant ENI, operating in Nigeria, have both admitted to more than 550 oil 
spills in the Niger Delta in 2014 alone. The Amnesty International analysis compared the 
Shell and ENI roles in polluting and destroying the African environment, due to negligence, 
                                        
23 NOSRA, Available at http://nosdra.gov.ng/ accessed 9th January 2017. 
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to the whole of the Europe where there were only 10 spills a year between the period of 1971 
and 201124. 
This excludes unreported oil spills. Repeated oil spillage is partly responsible for the soaring 
rate of unemployment in the region (Omotola 2009), since the majority of Niger Delta 
inhabitants were historically farmers and anglers. In addition, owing to the continual 
pollution of streams and creeks, fish can only be caught in deeper   offshore waters, for which 
the Niger Deltans are ill-equipped (Na’Allah 1998). Also, Wiwa (1992:44) aver that ‘in 
1972, an incidence of oil spillage (by Shell) that occurred at Dere – a small village in the 
Niger Delta – was so devastating that 20,000 people lost their means of livelihood. Acid rain 
fell on the area for months following this and both children and adults coughed blood’. 
Worse still, a High Court, presided over by a British-born judge, awarded damages against 
Shell [in the paltry sum of] £168,468, thus pre-empting the imposition of fines of tens of 
millions of dollars agreed upon by a special governmental committee set up to investigate 
the matter’ (Ibid.; Na’Allah 1998).  
In many of the oil-bearing communities, the net effects of oil production have been 
devastating, severely impacting on the environment and human health. In the last two 
decades or so   the popular campaigns by local people and environmental activists, supported 
by their allies abroad like   Amnesty International, have done a great job by identifying the 
double standards roles of the oil companies.  Amnesty International observed that the oil 
companies are far more likely to demand environmental and social mitigation efforts in, say, 
the North Sea or Alaska than in a more remote district of a developing country far away’.  
                                        
24Nigeria: Hundreds of oil spills continue to blight Niger Delta (2015) available at: 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/hundreds-of-oil-spills-continue-to-blight-niger-delta/ 
accessed 10th January 2017. 
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2.3:3 Shell in the Niger Delta Region 
Nigeria's first commercial oil discovery was in June 1956 at (Otuabagi/Otuogadi) in the 
Oloibiri25 district, by Shell Darcy. Oloibiri was the first West African oil well. It is 
interesting to note that Nigeria exported its first crude oil in February 1958 from the Oloibiri 
oil field.  
The Ogoniland refers to the Ogoni speaking people in Gokana, Khana, Eleme and Tai local 
governments of Rivers State. The people of Ogale - Eleme, Ogoni had been drinking water 
containing benzene 900 times above World Health Organisation (WHO) permissible limits 
(UNEP, 2011; Zabbey et. al 2017). Can Nigeria achieve complete environmental cleaning 
of the Ogoniland in good time? 
The UNEP (2011) report represents the best available report so far for the understanding as 
to what has happened to the Niger Delta environment. The UNEP thoroughly investigated 
the level of pollution in the Niger Delta, with particular reference to the Ogoniland, and the 
corresponding implications for the neglected communities over the years of oil industry 
operations in the region.  The report comprehensively provides the government, stakeholders 
and the international community with invaluable, baseline information on the scale of the 
challenge and priorities for action in terms of the environmental clean-up and in the Niger 
Delta to make life better for the devastated oil producing communities. 
                                        
25 The Oloibiri communities, today, lack the basic necessities of life as the black gold, an exhaustible asset, 
which then made the area to be called Bioforoama, nicknamed “Eastern Congo”, due to its booming social life, 
has since dried up and Shell moved to another location regardless of the dislocation caused to the locals. The 
people still face basic development challenges and environmental pollution caused by oil spills. “In spite of 
our peaceful disposition that led to uninterrupted oil production for several decades, development has eluded 
our community even as Shell which struck oil in the area has also abandoned the well”.See Oyadongha, S. and 
Idio, E. (2016) ’60 Years after Nigeria’s first crude: Oloibiri Oil dries up, Natives wallows in abject poverty’ 
Vanguard 13 March 2016, available at the following link:Read more at: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/60-years-after-nigerias-first-crude-oloibiri-oil-dries-up-natives-
wallow-in-abject-poverty/ Read more at: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/60-years-after-nigerias-first-
crude-oloibiri-oil-dries-up-natives-wallow-in-abject-poverty/ accessed 12 April 2017. Shell D’Archy did never 
conduct Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) see Okonta, I. and Douglas, O. (2003) ‘Where Vultures Feast 
– Shell Human Rights and Oil’ page 65. Verso, London. 
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At the request of the federal government of Nigeria, the UNEP team of researchers 
examined: 
… more than 200 locations surveyed 122 kilometres of petroleum and gas pipelines. 
The team reviewed more than 5,000 medical records of the host communities and 
engaged discussions with over 23,000 people at local community meetings.  The 
team of experts also carried out detailed examinations of the contaminated soil 
investigations at 69 sites in the Niger Delta’s most polluted areas. Altogether more 
than 4,000 samples were analysed, water taken from 142 ground water monitoring 
wells drilled specifically for the study and soil extracted from 780 boreholes 
(UNEP, 2011:6). 
 
The UNEP (2011) report findings reveal that there are, in a significant number of villages 
and locations, serious threats to human health from contaminated drinking water and 
concerns over the viability and productivity of ecosystems.  The pollution and destruction 
of the environment by oil companies has perhaps gone further and penetrated deeper than 
many may have previously projected, the population is experiencing severe health risks.  
2.4 The Niger Delta People Perspective 
The oil abundant Delta region is agitating for the local ownership of the oil and gas resources, 
which led to the formation of militant groups. The activities of the militants include 
destruction and vandalization of critical national assets (oil and gas) pipeline networks and 
kidnapping for ransom. 
The conflict in the Niger Delta by the oil bearing communities is waged fundamentally to 
challenge the national ownership of the oil by Nigeria because the oil economy is structured 
to exclude the resource rich communities (Ojakorotu and Gilbert 2010; Adunbi 2015). The 
oil bearing communities, as a result of their exclusion or greed, (they themselves might argue 
that it is not greed—their people are starving to death and have few medical services, and 
the wealth of their land is being taken away by kleptocrats in Abuja; they might argue that 
this is fundamentally unjust and they are interested in justice as opposed to personal 
enrichment) want local ownership of the oil-rich environment. The Nigerian constitution 
does not allow local, regional or tribal ownership of mineral resources anywhere in the 
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country. On the absolute ownership, control and management of the natural resources and 
hydrocarbon, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) section 
44 (3) and item 39 Schedule II of the Exclusive Legislative List, states:  
Notwithstanding the foregoing provision of this section, the entire property in and 
control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in 
Nigeria or in, under or upon territorial waters and the Economic Zone of Nigeria 
shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner 
as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.26 
 
This power is firmly provided for in Section 44 (3) of the Constitution of Nigeria, the entire 
extractive resources under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon territorial waters 
and the Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall 
be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. Kenneth Omeje 
(2006) argues that the contending issues underpinning oil conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
can be reduced to a nexus of institutional, ecological and social factors. The militarization 
of the region had begun to gradually elicit a response in the shift in local resistance from a 
non-violent to a violent form. The new groups included MEND, Egbesu Boys of Africa 
(EBA), Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA), The Atangbala Boys (TAB), Niger Delta 
Vigilante (NDV), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Freedom 
Fighters (NDFF) and the recently formed Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) amongst others. 
Most resource rich developing countries, especially African countries such as Liberia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone, witnessed protracted, extractive, 
economic induced (diamond and gold) conflicts. There are multiple stakeholders involved 
in the conflict. Firstly, the domestic actors (represented by the warlords); and, secondly, the 
international actors (European and American mercenaries). Africa is the location of the 
Western countries most mercenary operations27.  
                                        
26 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (amended), Abuja, Nigeria. 
27 Bruce Blain, writes on the roles of the developed world in prolonging conflicts in the resource rich countries 
as thus: “mercenaries are as old as war itself. Nevertheless, the modern mercenary traces its origins back to the 
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The Niger Delta militants are getting almost all the weapons illegally from the mercenaries 
and to some extent the Nigerian army too, sell weapons to the Niger Delta militants28. 
In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, too, there are multiple actors involved in the politics of 
natural resources conflicts; management, security and development. In the case of the Niger 
Delta, Ukoha has argued that there is a conflict between two distinct actors: (a) those 
clamouring for the local ownership of the oil-rich environment and ecosystem and (b) the 
state and its allies who struggle to maintain the status quo – the national ownership of the 
environment and security structures. In Nigeria, the oil bearing communities are posing a 
threat to the state’s legitimacy through the formation of many militant organizations in the 
name of environmental and social justice.  
The communities in the Niger Delta region, in collaboration with rebel groups with the 
capacity to produce violence, generate the capacity to obstruct. In the recent conflict in the 
Delta region, the umbrella militant group MEND is claimed to have had a membership of 
between 5,000 and 10,000 at its height (Imai and Blaire 2012).  
In the Ogoniland, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) was 
founded in the early 1990s. MOSOP instantly became an articulate rallying point for the 
people. The raison d’eˆtre of MOSOP was primarily to enable the Ogonis – the largest ethnic 
minority group in the Niger Delta – to press for reprieve, to gain a degree of autonomy, and 
to draw international attention through the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR). With its origins 
                                        
Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) Crisis which was fought between 1960 and 1965, 
following that country’s independence from Belgium. The presence of European and American mercenaries, 
often supporting a particular ideological faction, was a common trend throughout Cold War conflicts in Africa. 
Over the course of innumerable conflicts during and after the Cold War, mercenaries have proven to be a 
valuable tool for governments that are seeking to preserve their power base, as well as insurgent groups that 
have sought to overthrow existing regimes. Although it is not the only continent to be plagued by mercenaries, 
Africa is the location of most mercenary operations. Most recently, the ongoing conflicts in Angola, Sierra 
Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have all been prolonged in large part due to the continued 
presence and employment of mercenary forces by both governments and rebel groups. Traditional mercenaries 
give little thought to allegiance to a particular side or cause, save for their own material gain”. Available at: 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3396.htm accessed 29th October 2016. 
 
28 For details, see ‘Army Officers Who Sold Weapons to Militants’. Available at: 
http://www.nairaland.com/105920/army-officers-sold-weapons-militants accessed 13 January 2017. 
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in the Ijaw ethnic minority group dispersed across the coastal states of the Niger Delta, 
MEND is the largest and most dangerous of all resistance groups to have emerged from the 
Niger Delta. According to MEND and its supporters, the Niger Delta people have suffered 
from decades of environmental degradation due largely to unregulated pollution produced 
by oil companies operating in the area (Watts 2014). This is facilitated by national state 
policies that continue to deprive local communities of their land in favour of foreign oil 
interests and capitalist expansion (Omotola 2006). The Economist (18 September 2008) 
describes MEND as a political organisation that wants a greater share of Nigeria’s oil 
revenues to go to the impoverished region that sits atop the oil. In fact, it is more of an 
umbrella organisation for several armed groups, which it sometimes pays in cash or guns to 
launch attacks. This description resonates with a statement made by Jomo Gbomo, a 
spokesperson for one of MEND’s factions: ‘MEND is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups 
in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who 
have had relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian 
government and oil companies over the last fifty years’ (cited in Obi 2009, 123). Ike Okonta, 
author of ‘Behind the Mask’: explaining the emergence of the MEND militia in Nigeria’s 
oil-bearing Niger Delta, interviewed some of MEND’s declared members directly and 
describes the group as not so much an ‘organisation’ but ‘an idea in which many civic, 
communal, and political groups, each with its own specificity and grievances, have bought 
into’ (Okonta 2006, 4). Membership in MEND is reputed to be fluid, with militants involved 
with several groups simultaneously or concurrently Jomo Gbomo indicates that the group’s 
members are ‘volunteers’ (Daily Trust, 23 May 2009)29. 
Since late 2005, the resistance against the state and multinational oil corporations operating 
in the Niger Delta region has taken a more violent and sophisticated turn with the emergence 
                                        
29 Daily Trust, available at: https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/ accessed 15 July 2015 
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of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) militants (Courson 
2009). In November and December of 2005, two bombs were detonated in the creeks of 
Rivers State, destroying two Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) pipelines 
located in the Okrika and Andoni axis with no person or group(s) claiming responsibility. 
On January 11, 2006 an SPDC oil-field located about 20 kilometres offshore was attacked 
and damaged, and four expatriates were abducted by militants after a fierce gun duel with 
the military guarding the oil-field. The dust had barely settled when on Sunday January 15, 
2006, MEND militants ’attacked and destroyed one flow station and two military house-
boats belonging to SPDC in Benisede, Bayelsa State’ (Courson, 2011:14).  
Just like the newly-formed Niger Delta Avengers, MEND’s objective, according to the 
spokesperson of MEND Jomo Gbomo, “is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian 
government to export oil”. These attacks and the reduction in oil production of 400,000 
barrels per day led to a hike in the price of oil on the international market and subsequently 
reduced Nigeria’s oil output. 
 The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), a new violent militant group, emerged in 2015 after 
Nigeria’s general election.   Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region is currently mired in a 
major insurgency by Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) militants attacking oil pipelines of the 
multinationals, oil installations and federal government security forces. The newly formed 
(2015) NDA insurgency appears to be a fantastic example of the “resource curse” thesis that 
seeks to establish strong connections between natural resource abundance, the paradox of 
plenty and violent environmental conflict in the resource rich countries.  
Niger Delta Avengers further worsened the environmental degradation confronting the 
region. The bombing of oil pipelines, which results in oil spills affects the means of 
livelihood of the people as well as their health. Not only the armed and non-armed activists 
protested against the destruction of the environment by the MNCs supported by the Nigerian. 
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The Niger D elta women have played an important role, I shall discuss the role of women or 
women’s movements in the Niger Delta under 2.4.1, below. 
2.4.1 Women’s Resistance to State Violence  
The women in the Niger Delta grievances mostly revolved around issues of the degradation 
of the environment, unemployment and absent of essential social amenities.  The people in 
the Niger Delta have paid the supreme price fighting for environmental, developmental and 
social justice. Nigerian state used of brute force resulted in the death of over 1,800 including 
women and children, over 30,000 population made homeless, and countless others 
imprisoned, raped, tortured and beaten up (Rowell 2017).  
The women protesters ‘grassroots environmentalism’ (Ukeje 2004) gathered momentum 
under the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA)30 and resolved that Shell 
Petroleum Company to quit the Niger Delta region. The women declaration stated "Shell 
cannot and must not be allowed in Ogoni...we say no to Shell as it remains Persona non grata 
in Ogoni". The declaration was endorsed by over 300 women leaders that represented 57,000 
active FOWA's registered members, all were rural women seeking for justice and dignity 
(Barikor-Wiwa 1997). The women’s well organised and sophisticated non-violent struggles 
for environmental, developmental and social justice has drawn the attention of the 
international community and solidarity to the deprived women. All attempts by the Nigerian 
state to subvert the women environmental movements have not succeeded. Hence, the 
women resistance opened a new chapter in the Niger Delta struggle for the environmental 
justice. 
                                        
30 It was on April 25, 1997 the Federation of Ogoni Women’s Association (FOWA) an umbrella organization 
for all women's groups in Ogoni, the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The era of the most intense protests 
began on January 4th, 1993, when the Ogoni people took their future into their hands and peacefully protested 
nearly four decades of environmental devastation by the Shell oil company. Over 300,000 people participated 
from a total Ogoni population of 500,000 and not a single stone was thrown (Barikor-Wiwa 1997).  
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2.4.2 Global Action on the Environment 
Not only the growing demands of the local people and domestic environmentalists and 
organised women protests against the environmentally irresponsible oil extraction in the 
Niger Delta. The demands for the preservation of the environment has received global 
attention and has been incorporated into political context within the United Nations 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)31 and the Paris Climate Agreement’s32 with the 
central aim to strengthen the global response to the threat to the global environment. The 
UN SDGs has 17 goals and goal number 13 specifically called for ‘Climate Action’ and has 
the following targets: 
 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural 
disasters in all countries. 
 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning. 
 Improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity on 
climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning. 
 Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country parties to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly 
$100 billion annually by 2020 from all sources to address the needs of developing 
countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on 
implementation and fully operationalize the Green Climate Fund through its 
capitalization as soon as possible. 
                                        
31 SDGs was  has 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) to transform our world. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/envision2030-goal13.html 
 
32 The Paris Agreement (was signed 12th December 2015) builds upon the Convention for the first time – brings 
all nations into a common cause to undertake take ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its 
effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. As such, it charts a new course in the 
global climate effort. Available at: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-
paris-agreement 
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 Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related 
planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing 
States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities. 
Nigeria is a signatory to both ‘The Paris Climate Agreement and SDGs ‘to achieve the 
above-mentioned targets before the year 2030. 
2.5 Federal Government of Nigeria’s Responses to Niger Delta Challenges 
The federal republic of Nigeria consists of thirty-six states, seven hundred and seventy-four 
local government areas and the federal capital territory Abuja – the seat of power.  
The federal government has power or exclusive rights over any natural resources found 
anywhere in Nigeria, as enshrined in the ‘Land Use Act Decree No. 6 of 197833’. In addition, 
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as Amended; Nigerian Minerals 
and Mining Act, 2007, and the Petroleum Act 1969 Cap P 10, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria 2004 all vested the ownership of natural resources on the people of Nigeria. The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) of 1999, as amended, confers 
exclusive power on the Nigerian State to own, control and regulate the activities of minerals, 
mineral oils and by-products.  
Similarly, the Petroleum Act of 1969 also empowered the federal government of Nigeria to 
handle all minerals exploration and exploitation as succinctly put forward in the preamble 
thus: 
An Act to provide for the exploration of petroleum from the territorial waters and 
the continental shelf of Nigeria and to vest the ownership of, and all on-shore and 
off-shore revenue from petroleum resources derivable therefrom in the Federal 
Government and for all other matters incidental thereto. 
 
                                        
33 The Land Use Use Act of 1978: vested the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under, or upon 
any land in Nigeria, or under the territorial waters shall be vested in the Nigerian State not an individual 
possession. available at: http://www.nigerialaw.org/Land%20Use%20Act.htm accessed 28 April 2017. 
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The oil host communities’ voice out their grievances against the Nigerian government 
through protest and rally for not developing the rural communities in the oil producing areas 
(Ogoni Bill of Rights 1993). This chapter examines the various special agencies established 
by the federal government in order to meet the developmental yearning of the oil rich 
communities. What has the federal government   done or is doing in addressing the 
developmental needs of the host communities? The section analyses the federal 
government’s special programme and agencies, specifically meant to address the Niger Delta 
Developmental issues. The special agencies include among others; Ministry of Niger Delta 
Affairs, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), special intervention funds (13 
per cent derivation funds to the oil producing states), the amnesty Programme to the militants 
as well as the development projects and special scholarships exclusively to the indigenes of 
the oil producing states of the Niger Delta region.  
To address the myriad of developmental and security challenges as well as neglect, the 
federal government established various agencies since the discovery of oil in the region. 
There have been various attempts and many development agencies and regional master plans 
made in the past to improve the well-being and living conditions of the oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. In view of all the efforts made, each of 
the special agencies and plans ended with   little or nothing to show for the time and resources 
spent, the oil producing communities are still wallowing in abject poverty or thirsty in the 
middle of water34. What are the problems that retard development in the Niger Delta, is it 
greed or grievance or both? There were different types of development approaches and 
agencies applied to develop the Niger Delta region but most of the agencies were 
characterised by corruption and preceded by another similar agency. 
                                        
34 Field interviews with the Paramount ruler in Eleme, Nkpe on the 26th January 2017. 
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It is pertinent to name some of the special agencies formed by the federal government of 
Nigeria in the last decades and in recent times purposely to address developmental needs 
and security challenges in the Niger Delta, which includes: 
2.5.1 The Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) 
The NDDB was established in 1961 by the Niger Delta Development Act (1961), as 
recommended by The Sir Henry Willink Commission (1958). The Willink’s commission 
recommended that the Niger Delta area deserved special development attention by the 
Federal Government of Nigeria. The Commission recommendations were made even before 
crude oil became a mono-economy for Nigeria revenue generations. In the 1950s about 70 
per cent of Nigeria’s population derived their livelihood from agriculture35.  
The Federal Government, in response to the Commission recommendations, established the 
Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) in 1960 to plan and manage the developmental 
needs of the people of the Niger Delta region. The special area earmarked was referred to as 
‘Yenagoa Province’, ‘Degema Province’, ‘the Ogoni Division of Port Harcourt and the 
Western Ijaw Division’ of Delta province in the present day (Delta State). The NDDB in its 
seven years of existence had done a little until it was scrapped by the military regime in 1966 
and the Biafran civil war of 196736. Unfortunately, or fortunately, like most of Nigeria’s 
development master plans and programmes of action, the NDDB has not achieved any of 
the purposes for which it was established. 
                                        
35 The economy of Nigeria historically was based on agriculture, and about 70% of the workforce is still 
engaged in farming (largely of a subsistence type). The chief crops are cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, corn, rice, 
sorghum, millet, soybeans, cassava, yams, and rubber. In addition, cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs are raised. 
Details available at: http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/world/nigeria-economy.html Accessed on 30 
December 2016.  
 
36 See Niger Delta Regional Master Plan, 2007. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
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2.5.2 Oil and Mineral Producing Area Development Commission  
The OMPADEC, established by Decree No. 23 of 1992 as the result of discontent and 
restiveness by the oil producing communities, mandated the military ruler Ibrahim 
Babangida regime to set up the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Commission (OMPADEC). 
The law establishing the OMPADEC allocated three per cent of federal oil revenue to the 
Niger Delta region to address developmental needs of the areas. With the formation of the 
OMPADEC, communities in the oil rich region were so happy that the developmental 
challenges in the region would be addressed but unfortunately it was a disappointment just 
like the NDDB. There was massive corruption, mismanagement and inefficiency in the 
management of the three per cent allocation. Throughout its existence, from 1992 to 1999, 
it has done little and the majority of the communities in the creeks and rural areas did not 
benefit from its so-called developmental activities, just like its predecessor organization. In 
reality OMPADEC failed abjectly to address the grievances of the Niger Delta people. 
Nigeria’s former President Obasanjo, in May 1999, after realising that the OMPADEC had 
failed in executing its principal mandate, submitted a Bill to the National Assembly for the 
establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace OMPADEC 
(NDDC, 2004). 
2.5.3 Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
The Ministry of Niger Delta was established in September 2008 by the late president Umaru 
Musa Ya’adua with the aim of addressing the grievances and developmental challenges in 
the region. The Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs commenced operations in April,2009. The 
Ministry was saddled with the responsibility of coordinating the activities of stakeholders, 
communities and donors (collaborating with UNDP and World Bank) involved in the 
development and environmental sustainability of the region’s development.  
The functions of the Ministry are as follows: 
(1) Oversee the implementation of Government policies on the development and security of the Niger Delta. 
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(2)   Coordinate the formulation of the development plan for the region. 
 
(2) Formulate policies and programme for Youth mobilization, empowerment and development.  
 
(3) Facilitate private sector involvement in the region’s short, medium and long-term development.  
 
 
(4) Liaise with oil companies in the region, to ensure environmental protection; oil spillage and pollution are 
controlled. 
 
(5) organize human capacity development as well as skills acquisition, apprenticeship training and 
scholarships programme for the unemployed youth. 
 
 
(6) Take adequate measures to ensure durable and stable peace and security with a view to enhancing the 
socio-economic potentials of the region in particular and Nigeria in general. 
 
(7) To supervise the activities of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) activities (NDDC 
2000)37.  
 
 
2.5.4 Niger Delta Development Commission  
The Niger Development Commission was established by Act No. 6 of 2000, under the 
leadership of former president Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), to address the neglect and 
suffering (chronic poverty and unemployment) and to develop the region economically. The 
Commission was officially inaugurated on the 21 December 2000 with a primary vision and 
mission to “…. offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta 
region" and   "to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta 
into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and 
politically peaceful" (NDDC, 2004). The function of the NDDC as enshrined in the 
establishment Act 200038 includes: 
(a)     Formulation policies and guidelines for the development of the Niger- Delta, area, 
(b)   conceive, plan and implement, in accordance with set rules and regulations, projects and 
programmes for the sustainable development of the Niger Delta area in the field of transportation, 
                                        
37 See Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Establishment Act (2000) available at: 
https://docs.google.com/gview?url=http://www.nddc.gov.ng/theNDDCACT.pdf&embedded=true accessed 
14 February 2017.  
 
38NDDC Establishment Act 2000, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. The Federal Ministry of Justice, 12 July 
2000. Federal Government contribution, which was to be equivalent to 15% of the monthly statutory allocation 
due to member States of the Commission from the Federation Account. Oil and gas processing companies' 
contribution of 3% of their total budget.  50% of the Ecological Fund Allocations due to the member States. 
Proceeds from NDDC Assets and miscellaneous sources, including grants-in-aid, gifts, loans and donations 
(NDDC, ‘Regional Development Effort’ 2004) Available at: http://nddc.gov.ng/masterplan.html Accessed 11 
April 2017. 
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including roads, jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, industrialization, agriculture 
and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, electricity and telecommunications; 
 
(c)     Cause the Niger-Delta area to be surveyed in order to ascertain measures which are necessary 
to promote its physical and socio-economic development, 
  
(d)     prepare master plans and schemes designed to promote the physical development of the Niger-
Delta area and the estimates of the costs of implementing such master plans and schemes; 
  
(e)     implement all the measures approved for the development of the Niger- Delta area by the 
Federal Government and the member States of the Commission; 
 
  
(f)     identify factors inhibiting the development of the Niger-Delta area and assist the member States 
in the formulation and implementation of policies to ensure sound and efficient management of the 
resources of the Niger-Delta area, 
  
(g)     assess and report on any project being funded or carried out in the Niger-Delta area by oil and 
gas producing companies and any other company including non-governmental organisations and 
ensure that funds released for such projects are properly utilized; 
  
(h)     Tackle ecological and environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral in 
the Niger-Delta area and advise the Federal Government and the member States on the prevention 
and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution-, 
  
(i)     Liaise and work with the various oil, mineral and gas prospecting and producing companies on 
all matters of pollution prevention, mediation and control. 
  
(j)     To carry out other functions, which in the opinion of the Commission, are required for the 
sustainable development of the Niger Delta region, environment and its communities. 
 
The petroleum minister, Mr Ibe Kachikwu calls for the audit of the NNDC, in his words:  
I think we need an audit because it will not be wise to have agitation of this kind 
in the circle after each agitation comes back again to demand for the same thing 
when intervention funds had made no impact on the lives of the ordinary people. 
Kachikwu, This Day Newspaper 27 August 201639. 
 
 
2.5.5 Special Intervention/Ecological Funds 
In view of the significant amount of money channelled into the Niger Delta development 
agencies in the last five decades or so, to meet the desires and aspirations of the host 
communities of the oil-rich environment for infrastructural development and poverty 
                                        
39 Kachikwu, I (2016)  $40bn Spent on Niger Delta in 12 Years without Result, available at: 
https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/08/27/kachikwu-40bn-spent-on-niger-delta-in-12-years-
without-result/ accessed 14 January 2017.  
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alleviation, there is very little to show commensurate to the money spent. It is fantastically 
clear that the money goes into the pockets of a few elite (greed), mostly government officials 
and contractors and people are protesting against the state (grievance). The oil producing 
communities are not feeling the impact of the funds, as much needed infrastructure is not 
being provided by the NDDC or state governments in the region. Why is the Niger Delta so 
complex? What can be done about it? Oil and gas communities in the Niger Delta have 
revealed that from 2007 to 2014, a total of seven years, not less than one trillion, seventy-
four billion, fifteen million, five hundred and eighty-two thousand Nigerian Naira  
(N 1,074,015,582,000.00) have been remitted to the oil and gas producing communities in 
the Niger Delta from the 13 per centderivation funds (Oyibode 2017)40. 
Apart from the special agency of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and 
Ministry for Niger Delta Affairs with   estimated annual budgets of over $2 billion dollars. 
The federal government, from the consolidated oil revenue, has given the Niger Delta states 
(state government) an additional 13 per centas ecological derivation funds. 
2.5.6 The Niger Delta Regional Master Plan  
The Master Plan for Niger Delta is a comprehensive regional Master Plan that is hailed as a 
tool that the millions of people of the Niger Delta region can use to actualize their plan and 
common vision to build their future to the standard they desire for a better life. The Niger 
Delta Master Plan was designed to offer stakeholders, at local and state levels, individuals, 
groups and traditional institutions the opportunity to participate in the planning process. This 
was the first time Nigeria’s government had come-up with the bottom-up approach in 
addressing the Niger Delta developmental and security challenges. The Master Plan was 
designed based on what the people wanted in the next 15 years. It is a departure from the 
                                        
40 Oyibode, A. (2017) Oil producing communities: Niger Delta governors are embezzling our 13 per cent 
derivation fund. Available at: https://www.naij.com/1098868-oil-producing-communities-niger-delta-
governors-embezzling-13-percent-deriva.html accessed 10 May 2017. 
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previous development approaches. President Buhari recently launched a $10 billion Niger 
Delta Reconstruction Fund (NDRF) to implement the regional master plan41. 
2.5.7 The Amnesty Programme  
According to Ndutimi Alaibe, National Coordinator and Chief Accounting Officer of the 
Federal Government, the federal government of Nigeria declared amnesty to the militants in 
2009 to stabilize the restive Niger Delta region. It was a response to the security challenges 
by the then President to reduce fundamentally the violence that was taking place. After 
consultation with stakeholders, it was decided that there was a need to get the militants to 
lay down their weapons. That was the basis of the amnesty which was meant to stabilize, 
consolidate and sustain the security conditions in the Niger Delta region, as a requisite for 
promoting economic development in the area. (Daily Independent, 3 June 2012) The late 
President Yar’Adua announced the amnesty policy on the 25 June 2009. The amnesty policy 
stated that militants who freely surrender their arms within 60 days (6 August 2009 to 4 
October 2009) will not be prosecuted for the crimes committed in the process of disrupting 
the Nigerian oil industry. I shall discuss the details on the amnesty programme from the field 
interviews see page 206. 
 With the declaration of amnesty in 2007 by President Umaru Musa Yar’adua, the Niger 
Delta witnessed about seven years of relative peace. Amnesty is one of the concrete actions 
that the federal government has taken for militants who turn in their weapons and commit to 
abandoning violence. In May 2016, the region once again came under siege by militants 
called “the Niger Delta Avengers”. They are in the business of destroying oil infrastructure 
— working in teams, carrying small arms and explosives, blowing up pipelines and 
sabotaging facilities — taking advantage of the Delta's complex, creek-filled terrain to stay 
one step ahead of the Nigerian soldiers chasing them. Resources may be targeted for 
                                        
41 ‘Buhari to Launch $10bn Niger Delta Reconstruction Fund’ (2016) Available 
at: http://economicconfidential.com/2016/10/buhari-10bn-niger-delta/ Accessed on 30 December 2016. 
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destruction or damaged by bombs and other ordinance; war may displace populations into 
fragile environments where the struggle to survive degrades the resource base; the 
institutions designed to manage natural resources may be disrupted or shut down by war. 
As part of the amnesty process, a jailed and prominent militant leader, Henry Okah, has been 
released from prison and granted amnesty, though presently in prison in South Africa, Mr 
Okah was alleged to be the mastermind of the 1st October 2010 bomb explosion in Abuja. 
Many questions surround the amnesty process. First, for “disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration” (DDR42) to be effective, all three components of the process must be 
integrated and implemented. The existing process in the Niger Delta makes no carefully 
planned provision for reintegration, which should include resettlement, training, alternative 
employment, etc. One potential resource that has remained untapped is the preparedness of 
some oil companies to assist with technical training to enhance the employability of those 
given amnesty. Second, as with most DDR programs around the world, probably only a 
fraction of existing weapons is being surrendered, and it is not even clear that the weapons 
being turned in were those used by the militants. Third, for a DDR process to be entirely 
successful, it needs to be part of a comprehensive peace process. Without addressing the 
grievances of the militants and others in the Delta, it is unlikely that DDR can succeed. 
Fourth, many militants would have greater confidence in the disarmament process if 
international monitors were invited as witnesses with the assurance that the weapons turned 
in are put beyond use. Nevertheless, the government has resisted international observers. 
Fifth, some militants understand the purpose of the amnesty process to be a means of 
dividing the militants against each other.  The question arises; what is the government’s plan 
at the end of the amnesty programme? Will there be genuine peace negotiations with the 
                                        
42 In his brilliant article, David Smock (2009) ‘Crisis in the Niger Delta’ had discussed extensively on how the 
disarmament, available at:  https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/niger_delta_crisis.pdf accessed 14 January 
2017. 
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militants who have been demobilized? What if the principal leaders of the insurrection fail 
to accept the amnesty? The views and opinions of Niger Delta communities on amnesty 
programme has been presented in chapter five under the theme of ‘amnesty programme’ 
reflections from the fieldwork interviews. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The federal government under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari embarks on 
the Niger Delta environmental clean-up programme. The clean-up programme was officially 
launched on the 2nd June 2016 in Bodo, Rivers State. The Ogoniland, in Rivers State, has 
been the area most ravaged and devastated by oil spills in the last 10 years as revealed by 
the UNEP report (2011). The spills have destroyed the farmlands and aquatic life, and 
unleashed serious and multiple forms of land, air and water pollutions in the process43. Most 
of the development plans proposed for the region are similar compared to other projects from 
the central government, and there is no clear devolution of funding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
43 Ogoniland Clean-up and Remediation by the Nigeria’s Federal Ministry of Environment. Available at: 
http://environment.gov.ng/ogoni.html accessed 10th January 2017. 
57 
 
Chapter 3 
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents scholarly literature on the natural resources and violent conflicts. The 
following are the theories; greed versus grievance, resource curse, Dutch Disease, Horizontal 
Inequalities, Environmental security, Resource Governance Index and Resource abundance 
and scarcity. These are the baselines scholars of international development and conflict 
propounded to explain the phenomenon of natural resources conflict. 
3.2 Natural Resources, Governance and Conflicts: Review of Literature 
Since the days of decolonization, there has been a bourgeoning body of work on natural 
resources governance and conflict in the developing countries. African states have been 
trapped in multifaceted and multidimensional civil violence, or what Mary Kaldor (2012) 
and Le Billion (2004) calls ‘resource war’ or ‘oil war’ which is the classic example of the 
on-going strategic oil and environmental conflict in Nigeria. Since 1994, Nigeria’s Delta 
region has been a site of oil conflict.  It has been noted by several scholars that natural 
resources have played a distinct role in the history of armed conflict, especially in Africa. In 
Nigeria, oil wealth has constituted a problem, rather than a boon; for economic development 
and social security for many years (Oyefusi, 2010; Alao, 2007; Le Billion 2001). The themes 
of resource conflict, the environment and security all occupy a crucial place in the political 
agenda, especially among the resource-endowed countries of the world (Yates, 1996). 
Consciousness is increasingly developing among states, communities and grassroots 
organizations which have an impact on actual and potential effects of human activities on 
ecosystems (Ross, 2004: 35). The complex realities of resource politics are most often 
manifested in Africa, the Caribbean-Pacific and Latin America; where there is a conflict 
between multiple stakeholders, especially between host communities and international oil 
companies (IOCs) supported by the state.  
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Resource-bearing communities, supported by civil society organisations and international 
environmental activists, are challenging the federal government of Nigeria over the question 
of environmental protection and sustainable development in the resource-extracting regions. 
Local communities and environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are 
becoming nervous of the damages caused by commercial exploiters of the Delta environment 
(largely IOCs backed by the state). These have led to a pattern of protests, ranging from 
street demonstrations to hostage taking. Meanwhile, many countries constructed in the 
traditional ‘custodian’ paradigm are becoming more authoritarian in meeting the demands 
of the communities. Paradoxically, heavy-handed state interventions are often justified in 
the name of national security, economic stability and democracy (Omeje, 2008; Watts, 2005; 
Alao, 2007). Given Nigeria’s position as one of the world's leading oil producers and 
exporters since 2006, petro-violence has for strategic, economic and political reasons 
brought the Niger Delta to the forefront of energy, security, developmental and 
environmental concerns internationally and locally respectively (Obi and Rustad, 2011: 1).  
Conflicts are very prevalent not only in those countries that are built on the traditional 
custodian paradigm, but also which have fragile social structures that were originally 
imposed by the colonizers and inherited at independence. The greed of the ‘inheritance 
elites’ or the intellectual elite who took over the political leadership at independence and the 
desire to ensure the state’s survival in a world that had become dangerously competitive 
were among the factors that combined to heighten the propensity for conflict over natural 
resources (Alao, 2007).  
In addition, Bannon and Collier (2003) assert that ‘violent secessionist movements are 
statistically much more likely if the country has valuable natural resources, with oil being 
especially dangerous. Examples include Aceh and West Papua (Indonesia), Biafra (Nigeria), 
Cabinda (Angola), Katanga (Democratic Republic of Congo).  
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Accordingly, Collier and Hoeffler (2001) who came up with a new set of data using civil 
wars and conflict during 1960-99 and concluded that natural resources are the major 
causative factor in conflict. This can be explained by a typically severe grievance; such as 
high inequality, a lack of political rights, and ethnic and religious divisions in society. In the 
context of Africa and other developing societies, Klare (2002, 2012) provides a good 
discussion of natural resource extortion, such as diamonds in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
timber in Cambodia, cocaine in Colombia and oil in Nigeria (Zack-Williams 1999; Klare in 
Collier and Hoeffler 2001:3). Resource conflict is one of the several explosive phenomena 
that have defined many extractive economies in Africa since the end of the Cold War. Most 
such countries have been coping ever since with problems such as ‘intractable conflict’ 
(Vallacher et al., 2010), ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2005), ‘resource wars’ (Klare, 2002), a state of 
‘complex political emergency’ (Duffield, 1994; Collier, 2007), ‘resource securitization’, 
‘petro-violence’ and ‘blood diamonds’ (Tar, 2008: 32). Scholars to describe Africa’s conflict 
over valuable resources use all these negative terms. 
The consensus is that the abundant natural resource endowments on the African continent 
and the mismanagement of them remains the primary source of conflict—from the blood 
diamond conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia, to the Niger Delta oil conflict in Nigeria, to 
the rebellion in the Northern part of Niger Republic over uranium, to the problems in Angola 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are nations both very rich in resources but 
which never seem to witness peace. It seems that in Africa, whenever or wherever 
extractable natural resource wealth is discovered, conflict over ownership emerges between 
the state and the host communities. Tar (2008) further opined that the majority of conflict-
prone and war-ravaged states in the global south are rich in resources. These include those 
recently emerging from years of violent conflict: extractive economies which are endowed 
with strategic mineral and natural resources, yet could not avert declining into debilitating 
violence and war, a phenomenon known as the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Auty, 1993). 
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Moreover, in Africa, violent resource-related conflicts result in poverty, underdevelopment 
and human displacement, despair and disease. This is completely the opposite of using 
natural resources to eradicate poverty for sound social and economic development. Nigeria’s 
oil constitutes the primary source of the country’s underdevelopment. Nigeria is one of 
Africa's most powerful country, but the crisis in the Niger Delta region is a threat to its unity 
and stability. In Nigeria, substantial oil production and exploration for more than fifty years 
have not resulted in sustainable socioeconomic development in the country. In the Delta 
region of Nigeria, oil exploitation pollutes the environment and the spillages in most cases 
are not immediately attended to; oil spills often lead to a fire, causing the total or partial 
destruction of vegetation that trickled down to abject poverty in most of the rural areas 
(UNEP, 2011). 
Similarly, on September 25, 2013, Lamido Sanusi44, the then governor of Nigeria's Central 
Bank, wrote a frantic and unusual memo to President Goodluck Jonathan. In the memo, Mr 
Sanusi detailed how the government-owned oil firm, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), had systematically diverted a vast sum of money from crude oil sales 
between January 2012 and July 2013. Unfortunately, instead of investigating the allegations, 
Nigeria’s President Jonathan suspended Mr Sanusi's from his appointment. The allegation 
of the diversion of petroleum revenues into federal accounts supported by the world 
acclaimed forensic auditing firm45  engaged by the Office of the Auditor General of Nigeria. 
Of all crude oil sales within the period, the NNPC paid only 24 per centof proceeds into 
federal accounts. Mr Sanusi, asserts that the remaining 76 percent, totalling about eight 
trillion Nigerian Naira had either been diverted somewhere or stolen by Nigeria’s corrupt 
                                        
44 Sanusi Lamido’s Governor of  Nigeria’s Central Bank, letter to President Jonathan over non remittance of 
oil revenue, available at: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/resources/151244-download-sanusis-letter-to-
president-jonathan-on-nigerias-stolen-n8-trillion.html Accessed on 31st March 2016. 
 
45 Investigative Forensic Audit into the Allegations of Unremitted Funds into the Federation Accounts by the 
NNPC (2015) Available at: file:///E:/Full%20report20billion%20dollars%20missing%20oil%20money.pdf 
Accessed on 12 March 2016. 
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government officials – under the watch of President Jonathan. Also, Nigeria’s former 
petroleum resources minister Mrs Dieziani Alison-Madueke was arrested in London on 3rd 
October 2015 and is presently facing corruption and money laundering charges in a London 
court. Mrs Alison-Madueke was one of the most senior ministers during President 
Jonathan’s tenure as Nigeria’s president. She previously denied to Reuters any wrongdoing 
when questioned about missing public funds and fraud allegations (Payne, 2015). Mr 
Jonathan’s former national security advisor, Mr Sambo Dasuki, is presently in prison and 
facing trial for misappropriation of $2.2 billion of Nigeria’s money46. In recent times, oil-
rich Nigeria has become one of most corrupt nations in the world. The Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index ranked Nigeria as 139th out of 175 in 2012, and 
144th out of 177 in 2013 (Transparency International, 2016).  
From the statistics published by the World Bank indicate that the level of poverty has risen 
in Nigeria, with almost 100 million people living on less than a $1 (£0.63) a day, despite 
economic growth. The World Bank (2015) and Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics 
reported that 75 per cent of Nigerians are living below $1.90 per day and about 75 million 
people are living below poverty level. In fact, the current poverty rate exceeded that of the 
period before the first oil boom in the 1970s, which was 35 per cent ‘poverty rate has been 
put at 64.2% in 2013/2014, increasing from 62% in 2010’ (World Bank 2013 cited in Kolade 
et al 2018). The national social and transport infrastructure is in a desolate condition, and 
the country is marked by chronic internal instability and periodic flare-ups of violent 
conflict, ranging from ethno-religious conflict to the Boko Haram insurgency, to post-
election violence, to the Niger Delta crisis. One of the leading expert, Abiodun Alao believes 
that ‘the widespread belief that the central government unfairly appropriated the wealth that 
                                        
46 Alleged $2.2billion Arms Deal: EFCC pressuring SSS to hand over Sambo Dasuki for questioning. Available 
at: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/194286-alleged-2-2billion-arms-deal-efcc-pressuring-
sss-to-hand-over-sambo-dasuki-for-questioning.html Accessed 20th February 2016 
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belonged to them and that they would be richer if they were a separate state’ (2003: 16) is 
the major cause of the conflict.  
In Nigeria, there is no distinction between state resources and the personal possessions of 
officials, thanks to corrupt and personalized leadership since independence, especially 
during the era of military rule and the dictatorial regime. The Hobbesian-Lockean social 
contract has been damaged or destroyed, and Nigeria’s leaders are not accountable to the 
people. Like many states in Africa, Nigeria is not functioning well because of the culture of 
consumption, master-servant relationships and dualism in governance. By dualism, I mean 
that the government is so divided that it serves as a mediating force for receiving oil wealth 
and distributing it through consumption. 
Since the first discovery of oil in commercial quantities in the Delta region in 1956, and 
especially from the 1990s onwards, oil disorder in the Niger Delta region has been a festering 
problem for the Nigerian state. The conflict is primarily between the Multinational Oil 
Companies, the Niger Delta communities and the central-state apparatus. Youth militants in 
the Niger Delta supported by the local communities (host communities) are waging war and 
challenging the collective national ownership of the oil revenue by the Nigerian State 
(Ojakorotu and Gilbert, 2010). The Niger Delta people over the years have been toughened 
by the anguish, or what Kibreab (2017) term as ‘internal deprivation’ and chronic poverty 
imposed on them by different oil mining companies, and has become increasingly restive. 
Their youth has drawn both local and international attention to their deplorable situation 
through their protests. Oil exploring organisations can be said to be operating in a hostile 
and insecure environment. The responses of the government and the oil companies to the 
issues in the Niger Delta have been called into question by observers of events and by the 
Niger Delta people themselves. The oil-bearing communities want total control and 
ownership of the oil-rich environment and the ecosystem, but the Nigerian constitution does 
not allow the local, regional or tribal ownership of mineral resources anywhere in the 
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country. Omeje (2006) argues that the contending issues underpinning oil conflict in 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta can be reduced to a nexus of institutional, ecological and social factors. 
At the institutional level, oil-related legislation and policies remain a primary source of 
conflict. For instance, before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, colonial legislation like the 
Oil Minerals Ordinance of 1937 vested the ownership of oil and mineral resources in the 
British Crown. The post-colonial Petroleum Act (1969) and Nigeria’s Land Use Act (1978) 
removed the control and management of lands by the individual family, the community and 
the traditional chiefs, one elder-statesman I interviewed in the Niger Delta described the 
Nigeria’s Land Use Act’ as ‘forceful decree or act against the owners of the land and 
resources’47. The laws vested the governors of each state of the federation (in the case of 
urban lands allocations) and   the appropriate local government council (in the case of rural 
lands allocation) with the power over the land. The oil-bearing communities in the Niger 
Delta states see the post-colonial Petroleum Act and the Land Use Act as favouring the 
MNOCs to the detriment of the poor whose environment is degraded and exploited. On the 
environmental disaster in the Niger Delta, the United Nations Environment Programme 
(2011) findings reveal that there are serious threats to human health from contaminated 
drinking water, which concerns the viability and productivity of ecosystems (UNEP, 
2011:6). The people have protested against the government and the oil companies, seeking 
local ownership of the peninsula and environmentally friendly oil companies’ extraction of 
the oil. The Nigerian Mobile Police (MOPOL) has clamped down on the protests, and many 
protesters have been killed. On 31 October 2000, the Mobile Police (MOPOL) attacked 
aggrieved youths at Umuechem in Rivers State, who were protesting against the Shell 
Petroleum Company. Coercive force was used, and the protesters were dispersed. Ojakorotu 
                                        
47 Internals\\Chief TB-2_interview> - § 10 references coded [19.77% Coverage] Field interview with former 
Legal Adviser to Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People, in Bori Town, Februar y 2017.  
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et al. (2010) write that over 80 people were killed and about 500 houses were levelled, thus 
triggering an unprecedented number of Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the history of 
that community (Ojakorotu and Gilbert, 2010). The Niger Delta ‘violent conflicts also 
weakened Nigerian state by eroding its capacity to provide social services and relief, as well 
as to regulate access to resources and to mediate conflict (Kibreab 1998). 
What insights, if any, do current conceptualizations about rentier politics provide for 
understanding resource conflicts in the Niger Delta crisis? Do nascent narratives such as 
‘resource curse’ and ‘paradox of plenty’ provide appropriate explanations for understanding 
the nature of rent-related (greed versus grievance) and environmental conflicts in Nigeria?   
Alao (2007) is of the view that the link between natural resources and conflict is probably 
as old as human settlement. There are strong links between oil theft and the violence and 
insecurity in the Niger Delta region. Katsouris and Sayne (2013) argue that oil theft is both 
a symptom and a cause of violent conflict in the region. The illegal trade in stolen oil 
weakens public institutions and aggravates known conflict drivers. It deepens corruption, 
funds political violence and damages the environment. The criminal oil theft networks rely 
solely on violent conflict to hold onto their turf and secrecy in the Delta region. Some 
communities fight for the right to steal oil-weakened local power structures, mainly when 
the battle lines are drawn between ethnic groups or generations. 
The oil theft networks of local Niger Delta militants and multinational oil marketers (arms 
suppliers) have also settled in some of the Niger Delta’s most violent corners and are 
threatening the Nigerian state’s legitimacy. Over time, the illegal oil trade has become part 
of a larger Niger Delta oil conflict, since it is a lucrative business for the militants and their 
allies. 
Since Nigeria was returned to democratic governance in May 1999, various gangs, cults and 
militia groups, with support from powerful backers, have manipulated inter-communal 
tensions to gain control of illegal oil. In some cases, wars over oil bunkering have awakened 
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old land and chieftaincy disputes among neighbours, sparking fresh violence. By the late 
2006-07, some gangs were also turning to kidnapping and bank robbery, thus increasing 
insecurity in the area. A few militant commanders eventually outgrew their masters and 
assumed roles in politics and the local economy akin, at least superficially, to self-sustaining 
‘warlords’. Some now receive lucrative government contracts to guard the same oil 
infrastructure they once attacked. 
The people in the Niger Delta depend on the natural environment for their livelihood. The 
destruction of the environment through oil spills and gas flaring has made the poorest 
communities vulnerable and has direct deleterious impacts on their environment, which in 
turn has gravely affected agriculture, fishing, farming and health. The Rivers State Internal 
Security Task Force was formed by the government as a well-armed military outfit, directly 
under the control of the then Military Administrator of Rivers State, explicitly to deal with 
protesters in the Niger Delta region. The first radical organisation involved in organising the 
protests was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and its 
supporters. Between 1993 and 1996, they led a campaign against Shell and for self-
determination in Ogoniland. The environmental activist and the founder of MOSOP, Ken 
Saro-Wiwa, who challenged the Nigerian state and oil companies’ activities in the Niger 
Delta, was unconstitutionally and brutally hanged on 10 November 1995, under the directive 
of the military tribunal constituted under late Head of State, General Sani Abacha. Ken Saro-
Wiwa, along with the eight Ogoni compatriots; Baribor Bera, Saturday Doobee, Nordu 
Eawo, Daniel Gbokoo, Barinem Kiobel, John Kpuinen, Paul Levura and Felix Nuate, were 
known as the ‘Ogoni Nine’ (Amnesty International, 2009). In 1999, a protest by the Choba 
ethnic group community against WILBROS (a foreign oil servicing firm) was suppressed, 
an incident in which the Nigerian army killed ten people and several communities were 
temporarily displaced and deserted. On 4th January 1999, conflict erupted between the 
Nigerian Army and the Ijaw Youth Congress (IYC) in Bayelsa State, and as many as 240 
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people were killed in clashes between protesting Ijaw youths and government troops in the 
Niger Delta state of Bayelsa. In reaction to the Nigerian army killing of the Ijaws, Delta 
militants slaughtered nine Nigerian soldiers in a town called Odi in November 1999. In 
retaliation, the army killed over 1000 people as revenge48. 
Bannon and Collier (2003) assert that rebel movements in resource-rich developing 
countries, particularly those seeking to secede on the back of natural resources, are 
significantly bolstered by the presence of corrupt elite. The elite syphons off the revenues 
and invests in the developed countries rather than in a government that uses them 
transparently to raise living standards across the board.  
Beckman (1982) argues that the Nigerian state is ideologically serving and protecting the 
interest of the capitalist countries, to the extent that the Nigerian elite can be described as 
their agent. Many states in developing countries, including Nigeria, are protecting, defending 
and maintaining the interest of their metropolitan masters in the Northern Hemisphere. The 
First/Global North or the minority world, are engaged in criminal shady businesses to protect 
those interests. The oil companies of the developed world, especially belonging to the United 
Kingdom, United States, France and the Netherlands are ignoring human life and 
environmental considerations in resource-abundant countries; the reality is more manifest in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The Chatham House (2013) report tentatively pointed to 
the United States, Singapore, Brazil, China, Thailand, Indonesia, several West African 
countries and the Balkans as possible destinations of the stolen oil from Nigeria.  Apart from 
the pollution of the environment and involvement in the networks of oil stealing, Nigerian 
oil theft networks use foreign banks and other channels to store and launder their earnings. 
The United States, the United Kingdom and Switzerland are the possible money-laundering 
hotspots (Chatham House, 2013; UNEP, 2011). For example, during the 1997 civil war in 
                                        
48 Research and Action for Peace (2016) Nigeria (1990 – first combat deaths) Available at:    
http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/nigeria-1990-first-combat-deaths/#Deaths Accessed 29th March 2016. 
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Congo-Brazzaville, the private civil militia of former President Denis Sassou-Nguesso was 
funded, in part, by the sale of future exploitation rights from the Congo’s extensive oil 
reserves. On the eve of the conflict, Sassou received substantial assistance from a French oil 
company, Elf-Aquitaine (now Total Fina Elf). Some reports indicate that Mr Sassou-
Nguesso received $150 million in cash; others state that Elf helped him purchase arms (Ross, 
2003; Banon and Collier, 2000). For instance, the developed countries meddling in African 
internal affairs further prolonged conflict. Between 1989 and 1997, African countries 
recorded 124 natural resource-related conflicts while the rest of the world recorded 271 
violent disputes (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). 
These funds enabled Nguesso to defeat the then incumbent president, Pascal Lissouba, 
following a four-month war that destroyed much of Brazzaville and cost the lives of over 
10,000 people. These future booty swaps (selling the future right to the resources) – and 
similar trades in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone – in 
each case have helped to initiate a war or to prolong one. These are examples of just some 
of the roles MNCs have played in financing and prolonging resource conflicts in developing 
countries. Without the booty swap or future market, the rebel offensive and perhaps the 
violent conflict itself would have been less likely to occur. Funding of rebels from countries 
such as France and Britain, that is former Britain prime minister Margret Thatcher’s son 
Mark49 in Equitorial Guinea to trade in the booty, help to initiate conflicts and prolong pre-
existing ones (Banon and Collier, 2000). The ongoing protests and agitations in Nigeria’s 
south-eastern region ‘Biafra’ movement vindicated the role of oil extractive economies in 
conflict. 
                                        
49 See Thatcher's Son Held in Failed Africa Coup, available at:  
 https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/26/world/thatcher-s-son-held-in-failed-africa-coup.html, New York 
Times.  
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Although extortion and kidnapping are endemic in conflict zones, and especially have been 
so in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in recent times, a major resource industry can make 
these activities more profitable – both for the mercenaries and the transnational companies. 
Extortion and kidnapping have been important features of the Colombian civil war, and they 
also played smaller roles in the wars in Aceh, Indonesia and Sudan. In Colombia and Sudan, 
the targeted resource was oil – or rather a long oil pipeline that ran through contested 
territory. In Aceh, it was a natural gas facility. In Colombia, the oil must be transported to 
the coast from the unstable interior through pipelines that are hundreds of miles long. In 
2000, the pipelines were bombed ninety-eight times. Colombia’s rebel groups, for instance, 
have used these attacks to extort an estimated $140 million annually; this windfall has 
enabled one group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), to grow from fewer than 40 
members to at least 3,000 (Dunning and Wirpsa, 2004). Colombia’s rebel groups have also 
turned kidnapping into a major industry. According to a government study, between 1991 
and 1999, the rebel group earned a remarkable $1.5 billion from kidnap ransoms; many 
victims were associated with the oil industry. Similarly, in Nigeria, oil companies from the 
developed world are the ones arming the Delta militants to exploit Nigeria’s oil illegally for 
them. Because of the marriage of convenience between the Nigerian elites and transnational 
oil companies, Global Issues reports that the Nigerian government has been supported and 
maintained by the Western governments and oil corporations, who are keen on benefiting 
from the fossil fuels that can be exploited. Alao (2007) maintains that the manifestations of 
resource conflicts in the last quarter of the twentieth century were particularly devastating, 
with greater implications for the social and economic development in Africa. The typology 
of resource conflicts, from oil in the Middle East and solid minerals in African countries 
such as; Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and Nigeria to the 
land in Asia and agricultural products in Latin America – are all resource conflicts.  
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In the 1990s, two-thirds of Africa’s intrastate conflicts were civil wars. Africa had seven 
civil wars in the 1970s, eight in the 1980s and fourteen in the 1990s (Paul and Collier, 1998; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Ross, 2003). The escalation of violence in the Niger Delta region 
because of the presence of oil has created a high level of insecurity in Nigeria. The region 
has become a locus for the easy proliferation of small arms and light weapons into the hands 
of groups who are continuously threatening the security of individuals and the economic 
structure of Nigeria in the Niger Delta states. The destruction and vandalization of massive 
petroleum installations and taking hostages is mainly carried out by shadowy organizations 
like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta Volunteer 
Force (NDVF) with the aims of drawing Nigerian government and global attention to the 
injustices meted on the Delta’s people and the high prevalence of poverty in the resource-
rich region (Ojakorotu and Gilbert 2010).  
Tar (2008) argues that a review of the relevant literature reveals two similar but distinct 
approaches to study rentiers and resource conflicts in the global South. For example, the first 
is what could be termed as Limited Factor Approaches (LFAs). This means approaches that 
draw predominantly on narrow sets of factors such as rent or power with scarce attempts to 
appreciate their causal linkages. Another drawback of this approach is that other factors, 
such as the external environment of the rents and the global balance of power are either 
ignored or given limited attention. For instance, in the context of the Niger Delta oil conflict, 
different scholars emphasise different and often limited factors: the marginalization of local 
‘oil-bearing’ communities by dominant rentier elites (Omeje, 2004, 2006a; Ukeje, 2001); 
youth and the fetishization of violence (Ifeka, 2006: 721); environmental degradation 
perpetrated by oil companies and supported by the state (Ogri, 2001; Moffat and Linden, 
1995; Obi, 2001); disparities in the perception of security and the local ownership of 
resources by the Nigerian state and indigenous communities (Ibeanu, 2000; Obi, 1997; 
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Omeje, 2006a) and so on. There are risks in the tendency to cherry-pick a limited set of 
factors in explaining resource conflict.  
Ibeanu (2000) argues that the Niger Delta conflict and resource conflicts elsewhere are 
caused by multiple factors and issues, so a systematic approach is needed to understand and 
account for conflict in a more robust way. Furthermore, it is not clear if all the factors that 
are said to be responsible for the conflict are causal or mediatory, or if they are all causal 
factors, which are principal, secondary and tertiary. It is also not clear which factors are 
triggered, pivotal, mobilising and aggravating (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). 
Following former President Yar’Adua’s declaration of amnesty to over 20,000 Niger Delta 
armed fighters in 2009, an uneasy quiet has settled over the area (Francis et al., 2011). 
Despite the amnesty and the appointment of the special Ministry for the Niger Delta by 
Yar’adua administration, the fundamental conditions of extreme deprivation have remained 
unchanged in the Delta region. This is because developmental challenges facing the Niger 
Delta are still shaped by its turbulent history and are closely intertwined with recurrent 
patterns of instability, ethnic clashes and hostage taking. With little provocation, 
longstanding grievances could once again erupt into another cycle of violence. In the Niger 
Delta, state governors and oil corporations are too corrupt to effect changes to the suffering 
people of the region. The region's share of monthly federal allocation is higher than that of 
all other states in Nigeria, yet the quality of life in the region remains one of the worst 
compared to the amount of money allocated to the Niger Delta region.  
3.3 The Theories of Natural Resource Conflict 
This section will discuss the theories of natural resource conflicts as put forward by the 
scholars of armed conflicts and resource management. The chapter will review the following 
theories; greed versus grievance, resource curse and Dutch disease, ‘horizontal inequalities’ 
and ‘environmental security/scarcity’, natural resources charter (NRC)/resource governance 
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index (RGI) and resource abundance to attempt to illustrate how the theories explain the 
phenomenon and the problems. The critiques of the theories will also be examined. 
In this chapter, the theoretical framework position will also be examined to explain the 
current problems the oil-rich Nigeria is facing.  I propose figure 6, the various theories of 
natural resources governance. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Theories of Natural Resource  
3.4 Greed and Grievance Theory 
The greed versus grievance is a statistical model created by economist Paul Collier and Anke 
Hoeffler, Oxford University50 researchers; to determine whether greed or grievance-based 
                                        
50 See details at the following link: https://mintehbaa.wordpress.com/2014/05/18/is-grievance-or-greed-the-
main-cause-of-conflict-what-can-be-done-to-prevent-conflict/ accessed 14 June 2016 
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motives caused the outbreak of civil wars between 1960 and 1999 in 161 countries that were 
surveyed (Beswick and Jackson, 2011:41). The model had its findings premised on 
economic accounts which explain rebellion in terms of opportunity (or greed) as contrasted 
with political science literature which mainly explains the conflict in terms of motive (or 
grievance). Collier and Hoeffler’s model made comparisons of greed and grievance by using 
proxy measures in making a representation of each of the concepts. With reference to proxies 
for opportunity, Collier and Hoeffler considered indicators of opportunity for financing 
rebellion which includes dependence and extortion of natural resources, donation from 
diasporas, subvention from hostile governments, proportion of young males in the society 
and the average years of schooling, weak government military capability and the favorability 
of the terrain as well as the extent of social cohesion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:3-6). In 
proxying objective grievances as the motive for civil conflict, the authors also considered 
measures of grievance such as ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political 
exclusion and inequality (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001:6-7).  
Greed and grievance theory has been explored in various works, including Collier (1998, 
1999, 2000a and 2000b), and Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2002 and 2004). The greed versus 
grievance was put forward by scholars of armed conflict in resource-rich but least developed 
countries. In their various studies, Collier and Hoeffler investigated the causes of civil war, 
using a data set of wars during the period 1960-99. They tested ‘greed’ theory; focusing on 
the ability to finance rebellion, against a `grievance’ theory; focusing on ethnic and religious 
divisions, political repression and inequality. They find that greed considerably outperforms 
grievance. Consistent with the greed theory, dependence upon primary commodity exports 
substantially increases the risk of conflict in the countries of the bottom billion. Apart from 
Collier and Hoeffler, numerous other scholars have examined the causal mechanisms linking 
natural resource abundance and four dimensions of civil war: onset, duration, intensity and 
type (Rosser 2006).  The greed and grievance dichotomy, as influential as it may be, remains 
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shrouded in intense controversy as alluded to. While some scholars in academic and policy 
circles align themselves with either the greed or the grievance camp, others blame the 
combination of the two as the aggregate cause of the conflict. Those blaming the 
combination of the two argue that the presence of capturable natural resources like diamond, 
oil or drugs may be an indication of the supremacy of greed as a factor not only in the 
outbreak of conflict but prolonging it. It has been argued that “grievances can be present 
without greed, but it is difficult to sustain greedy motives without some grievance. Although 
greed and grievance are regarded as competing views, they may be complementary, as greed 
may lead to the grievance and vice versa” (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007:24). Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin are of the view that the greed or grievance or an amalgam of the two may be a 
precondition for the outbreak of civil war. It is either of them or sometimes combinations of 
both that are the main cause of conflict, although they cannot be considered   
comprehensively sufficient in the analysis of conflicts as there are other prospective causes 
of conflict that are context-specific, and some of these will be discussed here.  Based on 
these proxy variables, Collier and Hoeffler concluded that “opportunity as an explanation of 
conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as greed-motivated” 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2001:17). By this, the conclusion reached above suggested that the 
motives for rebellion (i.e. grievance) were not adequate explanations for the prediction of 
the outbreak of civil conflict, but instead an opportunity (the ability to wage rebellion, i.e. 
the economic indicators) had more explanatory power (Beswick et al. 2013:31). The study 
clearly establishes a relationship between dependence on natural resources and the onset of 
civil wars as natural resources are a good source for the financing of rebellions. Rebellions 
occur when the foregone income of the combatants is lower than that which rebellions 
present to them, and so the need for risk-taking may become beyond greed and grievance as 
a cause of conflict, whereas socio-economic and political causes can be cited as causes of 
conflict. It may not matter whether there is agreement among scholars as to whether greed 
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or grievance-based explanations is central to the cause of conflict; social, economic and 
political factors are indeed important in explaining the cause of conflict. People who fight 
in most instances do so out of their own individual and private motivations, and when they 
do so as part of a group, they fight because of group motivation (Stewart 2011). For those 
who engage in conflict out of private motivation, the economic factor might be the overriding 
motive. This is indeed in line with the Collier and Hoeffler model. According to Stewart 
(2011: 9), war benefits people and the uneducated young men, mostly stand to benefit 
immensely by employing as soldiers and getting loot-seeking opportunities. It should be 
noted that the political economy of conflict does create shadow economies which benefit 
combatants and their endogenous and/or exogenous patrons, especially when it breaks out 
in the midst of an abundance of exploitable resources such as gold, diamonds, drugs and 
timber which are usually illegally exploited and traded. This competition for resources fuels 
the violence rendering it more protracted due to the economic advantages it brings to the 
combatants and other interested parties. A classic example of this is the civil wars of Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Angola where the so-called ‘blood diamonds’ played a major role in 
sustaining the conflict as proceeds from the illegal sales of natural resources were used to 
purchase weapons (Beswick, 2013). In the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban continue to profit 
from the drug trade by way of protecting producers in return for protection fees or as 
middlemen that will buy from producers and funnel it into the international drug market 
thereby using the proceeds to fund the insurgency. Nigeria’s the federal government under 
the administration of President Jonathan has invested in the Global West Vessel Specialist 
Limited, (GWVSL), a firm widely believed to be owned by fugitive ex-militant leader Mr 
Government Tompolo. Mr Tompolo was awarded with a contract worth $103.4 million (over 
NGN15 billion) to supply 20 vessels for the use of the nation’s military authorities to secure 
the waterways which had been running riot in the Niger Delta, perpetrating illegitimate oil 
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bunkering, operating illegal refineries, vandalising oil supply pipelines, engaging in 
expatriate and oil workers kidnapping and piracy (Odunlami, 2012).  
In terms of group motivation for fighting a war, Steward argue that the existence of a political 
system without relative autonomy to groups as well as political exclusion are conflict risk 
factors in societies where these are extant may be prone to conflict (Stewart, 2011). 
However, in the case of ethnic conflicts, for example, the genocide in Rwanda, it is often 
said “group level hatreds and fears are the products, not the producer of violence” (Fujii 
2011: 102). It is the hatred and age-old rivalries and animosities based on perceived or real 
grievances that are translated into violent action perpetrated by one ethnic group against the 
other. It must be mentioned that the root cause of some ethnic or religious conflict is the 
legacy of colonialism. As captured in (Beswick and Jackson, 2011: 48), “Rwanda’s Belgian 
colonial rulers identified Tutsis as racially superior to both the Hutu and Twa and the Tutsis 
were regarded as being stereotypically more ‘Nilotic’ in appearance and purportedly more 
intelligent”. Therefore, the socio-economic division in Rwanda on ethnic lines was 
propagated by the colonialist which became entrenched and associated with animosity, 
where divisions and hatred became the hallmark of a polarised ethnic relation and deep-
seated grievances began to flow. The physiological and intellectual superiority and 
inferiority stereotypes advanced by the colonisers were bought into by politicians on both 
sides of the ethnic divide in propagandas that eventually yielded the catastrophic 
consequence of a violent genocidal conflict. Resource wars and environmental explanations 
of conflict are widespread. The argument is premised on the scarcity of the world’s 
renewable resources due to ever-increasing human activity, population growth, and 
distribution problems ensuing in unequal access to available resources between groups 
(Beswick and Jackson, 2011). This according to Beswick and Jackson may result in scarcity, 
group identity and deprivation conflicts. These are the direct repercussion of environmental 
and population pressures that set the pace for resource competition and thus increase the 
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propensity for the outbreak of such conflicts (Stewart, 2011). The California water conflict 
serves as an example of resource conflict which resulted in a legal action and the ultimate 
agreement on a new legal regime and the creation of an authority to monitor the agreement 
(Ramsbothan et al., 2016). Considering the effects of climate change on the planet and her 
renewable resources, the fear of a rise in resource and environmental conflicts is genuine. 
While the outbreak of conflict may have a plethora of causes in terms of structure, immediate 
mobilising of the literature is not exhaustive. Indeed, conflict is preventable as something 
can always be done about it before its outbreak. “The term conflict prevention encompasses 
the range of activities taken to mitigate the risk of imminent conflict, as well as those 
activities that seek to address deep-rooted causes that can lead to conflict in the future” 
(Sriram et al., 2010:16). Therefore, the effectiveness of conflict prevention interventions is 
contingent upon addressing the root causes of conflict. In an attempt to prevent conflict, 
especially those related to the economic cases of civil war, Collier suggested diversification 
of the economy away from dependence on primary commodity. The transparent use of 
revenue from primary commodity exports to fund effective basic social service delivery, 
concerted action from the international community aimed at preventing rebel groups from 
selling their looted commodities and addressing low income and economic growth by 
helping poor countries to accelerate their economic growth (Collier 2006). While economic 
diversification and improved economic performance both require a policy change by 
governments; these solutions, as well as the judicious and beneficial use of national 
resources for the common good of people, are all internal corrective actions that should be 
spearheaded by the state. While the international donor community can assist with economic 
reforms to ensure diversification and improvement of the growth rate of the economies of 
states at risk of conflict, national government should address corruption, social exclusion 
and misplaced government policies which should ideally be conditions attached to the 
foreign aid. The regulation and sanitisation of trade in resources looted by rebels such as the 
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‘blood diamond’ or ‘conflict diamond’ as in the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone and the 
‘Kimberly Process’ which aims to prevent the trade in such diamonds by rebel forces serves 
as an example of international action (Beswick, 2013). However, there are concerns that 
conflict diamonds still slip through this process and continue to pose a challenge to the 
tackling of shadow economies. 
3.4:1 Critique of the Greed versus Grievance Theory 
The greed and grievance hypothesis despite the findings by Collier and Hoeffler that 
grievance-based models are less powerful in explaining the conflict remains contentious as 
too many debates surrounding the aetiology of civil conflicts continue to be at cross-
purposes. Deep-seated counter-perspectives about the main causative factor for such a 
complex and dynamic social phenomenon like conflict will likely remain for the time being. 
It seems reasonable to deduce from this debate that mathematical exactitude is not indeed to 
be expected in seeking to explore the main causes of conflict. While other scholars like 
Francis Stewart are more aligned to the grievance-based explanation of conflict, the greed 
and grievance dichotomy is a critical component of the toolkit for the comprehensive 
analysis of a country’s conflict risk factor. While greed or grievance separately or an 
amalgam of the two can be deemed to be the main causes of conflict, they cannot be 
considered comprehensively sufficient in the analysis of conflicts as some conflict are 
context-specific. Whether the cause of conflict is found to be loot seeking or justice seeking 
or other prospective causes, conflict prevention interventions should at all costs seek to 
address the root causes of the conflict and other underlying factors that breed and sustain 
violent conflicts. 
The ‘greed and grievance’ approach pioneered by Collier and Hoeffler comprises the two 
major contending arguments in theorising and explaining natural resources-related violence, 
armed conflict and civil war, especially in the resource-abundant African countries. 
However, the greed versus grievance explanations for the causes of conflicts in Africa fails 
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to analyse the roles of MNCs from rich nations that help to fuel the conflict in Africa. For 
example, a Global Witness (2006)51 report argues that local, regional and international greed 
in the diamond and oil industries in Africa is the cause of a conflict too long ignored. Cramer 
and Hanlon (2006) criticises the ‘greed and grievance’ debate within neoclassical economics 
on the main sources of civil war and has crystallised around a simple dichotomy between 
‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. They argued that it is questionable whether the ‘greed versus 
grievance’ debate is useful as a means of understanding the violent conflict. These terms are 
difficult to separate and, moreover, it is unlikely that there can be a clear ‘either/or’ 
explanation of the causes of war. 
Studies on the causes of civil war have traditionally been carried out by political scientists 
and anthropologists. During the 1990s, however, mainstream economists came to dominate 
the debate and argued that economic factors were the main source of civil war and that the 
economic driver of civil war was the opportunity to exercise individual ‘greed’. This 
argument was in line with neoclassical assumptions that people’s behaviour is governed by 
rational choices that are made to maximise individual ‘utility’. Other economists – known 
as heterodox economists – challenged the mainstream orthodox neoclassical view and 
argued that economic grievances, rather than greed, were the driving force behind civil wars. 
The entry of economists into the study of civil wars forced serious consideration of the 
economic motivations of civil war. Nevertheless, there is a significant criticism of the 
neoclassical economic framework for explaining violent conflict: 
First, the orthodox economists mostly led by Collier and Hoeffler, Oyefusi and others had 
hoped that their methods would become more objective by employing sophisticated 
analytical and quantitative techniques to determine the roots of conflict and predict wars. 
However, rather than being objective, the choice of models and data sets became subjective. 
                                        
51 Global Witness (2006) ‘The Truth about Diamond’, available at  the following link: 
www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/the_truth_about_diamonds.pdf accessed 20 January 2016. 
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Second, with no precise way of defining or measuring motives for civil war, orthodox 
economists were forced to use alternatives that could be measured, known as proxies. 
However, these proxies were a poor approximation of reality. 
Third, the outcome of the orthodox theories and models did not fit with any detailed 
observation of reality. Furthermore, the neoclassical economic framework proved unable to 
predict wars. 
The ‘greed versus grievance’ debate within neoclassical economics has helped to popularise 
the distinction as a way of organising the analysis of policies responsible for violent 
conflicts. However, the debate itself is based on a distinction that is conceptually misleading 
and undermines the usefulness of the concept. It oversimplifies the primary causes of 
conflict. 
The concepts of ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ are more difficult to separate than the debate 
acknowledges and it is not clear whether there can be a clear ‘either/or’ explanation of the 
principal motivation for civil conflict. The stark distinction between greed and grievance has 
proven unhelpful. Therefore, the future of this field of study lies in probing the porous 
borders between these categories. Quantitative studies are important but need to be carried 
out with considerable caution. In particular, there is a need for more interdisciplinary, 
detailed and historical case studies of the sources of individual wars. 
Interdisciplinary case studies should make use of political economy and economic analysis 
and should learn from the ideas and questions raised by orthodox economists, however, they 
should not become trapped by the neoclassical economic framework. 
The appropriateness, measurability and categorization of the proxies used were also 
questioned in (Beswick and Jackson 2015). They have questioned the accuracy of the figures 
used in the research such as those on the primary commodity exports, lack of emphasis on 
the interaction between economic greed and political (grievance-based) motives in the onset 
of a type of conflict and whether there is a similarity of dynamics that applied to different 
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conflicts. According to them, it is a risky business relying on data collected in developing 
countries due to the propensity to access data sets that are of a narrow coverage, incomplete 
and inaccurate. Further compounding the problem is the fact that since some of the data were 
collected from countries already experiencing conflict, the risks of falsified data exist for 
potential reasons of lack of access to some areas. With respect to the motivations for conflict, 
it is contended that “there may be difference in motivation within groups themselves” 
(Beswick and Jackson, 2015:43) and further justifying this claim, they went on to say that 
the leader of a group may have a different set of objectives with foot-soldiers of his own 
group as an example. This brings me to wonder if all those involved in a conflict can be 
considered to have a set of ambitions and motivations for the outbreak and persistence of the 
conflict that is common to all of them. I would consider that it is almost impractical for this 
to happen since a group can sometimes overtly show uniformity of purpose, but innately 
each and every member might truthfully have a motive and ambition markedly different 
from that of the other. 
Another critic of Collier and Hoeffler model is David Keen in his article, Greed and 
Grievance in Civil War; Keen poses the question, “where greed has gained a hold, what 
grievances have made people so violently greedy?” He highlighted that these grievances are 
likely going to continue to fuel violence even in a post-war era (Keen 2012: 777). According 
to Keen, the grievance should not be discounted especially those of government actors in-
country and outside and critiques Collier and Hoeffler’s model for suggesting the apparent 
needlessness to investigate either rebel motivation or that of the society that produces and 
responds to the acts of rebellion. In contrasting their approach to that of Frances Stewart, he 
concluded that she “has not hesitated to convey the complexity of conflict, the importance 
of the state and the counterinsurgency in shaping the evolution of conflict, the diverse roles 
of grievances and inequality, and the factors that may prevent sharp horizontal inequalities 
from spilling over (in some case) into large-scale violence” (Keen, 2012:777). As lamented 
81 
 
by Keen, the rebel-centric nature of Collier and Hoeffler’s model has been criticised as it 
left out the role of the state not only as an actor but also as a conflict causing and prolonging 
institution (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005: 4). This according to them is an untested 
assumption that demonises the rebels as the cause of conflict at the exclusion of state actors 
making the model a pro-state bias.  
It is also relevant to reflect on some of the proxies used in Collier and Hoeffler’s study, some 
of which may simultaneously apply to greed and grievance. Considering the proxy for an 
opportunity in the study of greed, they used the proportion of young males in the society and 
the average years of schooling as one of the proxies. While it cannot be disputed that higher 
proportions of young males characterised by low levels of education pose a conflict risk in 
the face of few other viable opportunities especially where exploitable natural resources are 
in abundance. The research findings have failed to recognise the potential connection 
between grievances and lack of access to education (schooling inequality). It suggests that 
greed cannot be easily separated from grievance using proxies as the two can be mutually 
reinforcing. The greed that may have motivated ill-educated male youths to fight a war might 
have precipitated from the horizontal inequalities endured by their societies, which denied 
them basic education; a grievance they manifest by taking part in an open conflict by those 
deemed to be responsible for their ill fate. Collier, Collier and Hoeffler (The Washington or 
international financial institutions (IFIs) sponsored studies draws attention and raises the 
question who finances social science research in the era of Neo-liberalism?  
3.5 Horizontal Inequalities (HI) 
Horizontal inequalities theory was based on the notion that when cultural differences 
between groups coincide with economic and political differences, this can cause deep 
resentment that may lead to violent struggles (Steward and Brown, 2007: 222). What is 
vertical/horizontal inequality? Vertical inequality refers to the gap between rich and poor 
populations. While, horizontal inequality can be conceptualized as the gap between the 
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mineral rich and mineral poor regions in a given country (Ross 2007:237). For instance, the 
gap between the resource poor in the north and the mineral rich region of the Southern 
Nigeria is alarming. 
This theory is used to explain the complex nature of resources governance in developing 
countries. Horizontal Inequality (HI) is defined as ‘inequality among culturally defined (or 
constructed) groups, in contrast to Vertical Inequality (VI) which is inequality among 
households or individuals. HIs are multidimensional; they include a political, social and 
economic dimension, with a range of elements in each of these dimensions’ (Steward 2008a, 
2008b, 2008c, 2010; Stewart and Brown 2007; Stewart and Langer, 2008; Fitzgerald and 
Associates, 2001). Steward (2009) takes the view that horizontal inequalities are the most 
critical instrument for group inequality that can be a source of violent conflict. Group 
inequality can be used by leaders to mobilise people to political protest, by calling on cultural 
markers (such as a common history or language or religion) and pointing out instances of 
group exploitation as in the oil producing communities in Nigeria. 
In the case of the Niger Delta region, group mobilisation is especially likely to occur due to 
the political exclusion of the region and unequal development compared to the other parts 
of the country. Before the emergence of President Jonathan (2010-15), who came from that 
area, the people of the oil-producing region were excluded from formal political power, 
while most group members remain economically deprived as reported in the UNDP (2006) 
Niger Delta Human Development Report. The Niger Delta is a region suffering from 
administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, 
social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict. The results of 
poor development have been disillusionment, and frustration among the people about their 
increasing deprivation, as well as their deep-rooted mistrust of the state (UNDP 2006:36). 
For instance, in the current reality in the Niger Delta, Steward (2009) argues that severely 
depriving communities or people of political power have all sorts of adverse effects, 
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including making it harder to reverse other inequalities. Horizontal inequalities can occur in 
four dimensions namely: political, economic, social and cultural status, and for each, there 
is a variety of relevant outcomes and inputs. The theorists argue that the severe horizontal 
inequalities (HIs) or inequalities among groups are undesirable in them and can lead to 
violent conflict in multi-ethnic countries. In a heterogeneous country, politically excluded 
communities mobilise their supporters for violent conflict along ‘cultural’ group lines. 
Horizontal inequalities are multidimensional, including inequalities in access to political, 
economic and social resources, as well as in cultural recognition and status52. 
Why HIs lead to the type of violent conflict? Frances Stewart who is often associated with 
the grievance thesis suggests power differentials between groups and the presence of 
horizontal inequalities among culturally defined groups led to violent conflict. Horizontal 
inequality refers to “differences in groups’ access to economic, social and political 
resources”. She argues that horizontal inequalities are a predominant cause of civil wars and 
thus aligns her with the grievance camp (Keen 2012: 757). This position was predicated on 
the supposition that when economic, social and political power differentials exist between 
heterogeneous groups whether ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious or other categories, the 
outbreak of conflict motivated by grievances can be predicted. According to (Stewart and 
Brown 2008: 222), “the horizontal inequality explanation of conflict is based on the view 
that when cultural differences coincide with economic and political differences between the 
groups, this can cause deep-rooted resentments that may lead to violent struggles”. 
Therefore, the lack of level playing fields among diverse groups in the economic, social and 
political life of social life of a polity may be a salient precursor to a conflicting relationship 
between the powerful and the less powerful groups premised on an exaggerated sense of 
grievance. It goes without saying that when severe political, economic and social horizontal 
                                        
52 Langer, Mustapha and Stewart (2007) Horizontal inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: issues 
and policies.  
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inequalities exist in a society that becomes essentially polarised, the leadership and the 
deprived population at large will usually have the perfect motive for mobilisation (Stewart, 
2012). This has the possibility to lead to group mobilisation for the righting of such wrongs 
which usually result in violent confrontations. The presence of massive inequalities in a 
society in many instances intersects with poverty (a potential underlying condition that can 
breed conflict) which constrains the human security imperatives and thus fails to bring a 
peace dividend. Acting as a metaphor, it has been recognised that “the security of states 
could never be assured if their isolated islands of wealth remain surrounded by a sea of 
extreme poverty” (Greig et al. 2007: 251).  
Alastair et. al, further opined that the privileged access to resources by one group at the 
detriment of other groups is a form of countenance for the favoured group to wield more 
economic, social and political power, since the different dimensions of these inequalities 
usually interact in a reinforcing manner and will thus provide a recipe for the outbreak of 
violent conflict motivated by the grievance. While Stewart’s view of the cause of conflict 
sharply contrasts that of Collier and Hoeffler, other scholars too have advanced criticisms 
for the greed versus grievance thesis and have drawn between the two sides of the debate. 
Conflicts especially those arising from horizontal inequalities can be prevented by rectifying 
the inequalities that exist in societies. For instance, the oil rich sub-region in the Niger Delta 
(Ogoni people) are complaining of marginalization by the state ruling ethnic tribes in Rivers 
state as well as the central government53. This requires policy options that are economical, 
socially and politically inclusive (Stewart and Brown 2008). It is assumed that when 
inequalities that exist in society are corrected, there will be a chance to defuse the associated 
                                        
53 For instance, there is only one Ogoni man as member of the governing board of environmental clean-up 
programme in the oil polluted Ogoniland. During the field interviews, one of the respondents said the clean-
up ‘to me, I think it is a sort of cover-up on the Ogoni man. The people so far selected for this environmental 
clean-up in Ogoniland, the Ogoni man is not at the head. I want to say the Federal Government just bought this 
so as to achieve their selfish end’. FGD in Bori Town, Rivers State. 
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grievances that provoke conflicts. Conflict prevention should be all about preventing conflict 
by looking at the general conditions that reduce the chances for the eruption of conflict 
(Ramsbothan et al., 2016). Conflict prevention undertakings should be capable of addressing 
the proximate cause of conflict which may at times be politically mobilised by the 
indigenous political leadership; the encouragement of structural stability should be a key 
component and potentially achievable by way of strengthening the governance capacities for 
sustainable peace for countries at risk of conflict. It has been contended in (Gallopin 2006 
cite Wood 2001:22), that “the rule of law and good governance can keep risk factors of both 
greed and grievance from being converted into violent conflict, by curbing criminality and 
corruption and by giving confidence that grievances and exclusion, the most volatile sources 
of grievance can be overcome”. Conflict prevention could be an arduous task, and it should 
be blended into development intervention, as it requires both the recipient and development 
practitioners to nurture peace through good governance and participation. Apart from 
improving governance, development assistance should be tailored to other goals that have a 
significant direct impact on building peace and conflict prevention. These include economic 
vitality, reduction of poverty and disparities; economic and political participation and 
inclusion; rule of law, justice systems and respect for individual and group rights; 
environmental sustainability; equity and opportunity; respect for cultural rights and identity 
as well as maintenance of peaceful regional and international relations (Wood 2001 cited in 
Gallopin 2006). As can be seen, conflict prevention is a complicated process that entails a 
whole host of activities that at the same time tend to target a multiplicity of goals all geared 
towards building sustainable peace while addressing the development needs of communities. 
3.5:1 Horizontal and Vertical Inequalities: A Critique  
The scholarship on horizontal inequalities and conflict has mostly neglected the 
determinants of people’s perceptions of the prevailing inequalities. 
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No available data measures the inequality between groups in the Niger Delta (See Rose 
200754), for instance between urban and rural dwellers and between men and women. There 
is a need to do a great deal of research in the field to bridge the missing gap. Ross, argues 
that natural resources boom has strong effects on the labour force, but very little is known 
about its effects on the vertical distribution of income among the people. Since the oil in 
Nigeria is concentrated in the South geopolitical zone, the oil income distribution affects the 
other regions of Nigeria.  
3.6 Environmental Security 
In the last two decades or so, especially in the 1990s, because of the increased human 
activities, analysts have argued that environmental pressures might seriously affect national 
and international insecurity, and the politics of environmental security dominate global 
politics (Homer-Dixon 2010). The conceptual development in the studies of environmental 
security as a new theme in international politics marks the beginning of the environmental 
conflict school of thought. The scholars of this school assume that the environment has the 
capacity to reconstruct the behaviours of societies that cause violent conflict (Hagmann, 
2005). The politics of environmental security and justice received global attention following 
the United Nations Conference on ‘Human Environment’ held in Stockholm in 1972, those 
of Rio de Janeiro in 1992  named ‘Environment and Development’, the Johannesburg 
conference of 2002 on ‘Sustainable Development’, and the most recent in Paris tagged 
‘World Environmental Summit’ in 2016, that focus on the need to overcome the pollution 
of the environment, economic development and preservation of the environmental quality 
through environmental friendly manner. Glenn et al. conceptualised environmental security 
as ‘the relative public safety of the environmental damages caused by natural or human 
processes due to ignorance, accident, mismanagement or design and originating within or 
                                        
54 Data on income inequality are almost non-existent for mineral rich countries of the developing, gaining the 
income distribution data is critical. 
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across the national borders’ (Glenn et al., 2002). Environmental security is the pursuit of 
freedom from social instability due to environmental degradation and destruction. Also, 
inversely, Barnett et al. argues ‘environmental insecurity’ captures the ‘vulnerability of 
people to environmental degradation’ (Barnett et al. 2001:8). In addition to Barnett, another 
leading scholar in the field defines environmental insecurity as a situation ‘where rates of 
extraction exceed the rate of recovery of ‘renewable’ resources, leading them to their 
depletion’ (Obi, 2000: 50). This may occur in cases where the operations of the oil industry 
run contrary to the required minimum international safety standards. The mainstream 
literature on environmental security opines a strong nexus between environmental 
degradation and the escalation of conflict (Collier, 2000; Ikelegbe, 2005; Obi, 2009; Okonta, 
2006; Omeje, 2006; World Bank, 2000) as in the case of Niger Delta. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported in 1997 in its first Global 
Environment Outlook (GEO) that the overall state of the global environment was continuing 
to deteriorate beyond imagination and measures must be taken for the good of mankind. This 
message was reinforced in the UNEP’s second global report in which it pointed out that ‘the 
global system of environmental management is moving much too slowly’ (UNEP, 1999, p. 
xxiii). The third Outlook, published in 2002 just before the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, was hardly any more comforting, observing that ‘sustainable development 
remains largely theoretical for most of the world’s population’ (UNEP, 2002, p. xx). The 
fourth GEO, released in 2007, expressed the concern again that ‘real change has been slow’ 
and that ‘environmental degradation continues to threaten human well-being, endangering 
health, physical security and social cohesion’ (UNEP 2007, p. 34). The main message of the 
2012 GEO – the fifth in the series – was that the scale, spread and rate of change of global 
drivers of environmental change are without precedent with the result that environmental 
systems are being pushed to ‘destabilizing limits’ (UNEP 2012:4). Environmental insecurity 
and human rights violations are not unrelated to the tragedy of development in the Niger 
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Delta. Michael Watts (2013), for example, described the conditions in the oil-producing 
states as bleak and by any measure of social achievement in the oil states of Nigeria are a 
calamity’, marked by ‘nestled shacks, old canoes, and children who will be lucky to reach 
adulthood. Similarly, Osha (2006) and Mathew (2010) contends that ‘what marks out the 
Niger Delta region in recent years is its chronic underdevelopment, the jolting sense of 
neglect that engulfs the place and the general misery and violence that govern the lives of 
most of its inhabitants.’ The insecurities faced by the Niger Delta people in the face of these 
environmental harms come through increased vulnerability to resource extraction, disease 
and health burdens, loss of livelihoods due to diminishing capacities for agricultural and 
fishery activities, food insecurity and disasters of nature as revealed in different findings, 
especially the United Nations General Assembly (2008) which prompted for the UNEP 
(2011). These challenges are exacerbated by poverty which is itself a function of 
environmental degradation; unlike the wealthy, poor people in the Delta region lacks access 
to alternative services. The people in the rural areas live in locations that are vulnerable to 
environmental threats and lack financial and institutional buffers against these dangers 
(Global Leadership for Climate Action, 2009)55. Those who are most immediately affected 
by global environmental decline are those who have contributed least (or certainly 
proportionately less) to the problem. In both empirical and conceptual terms, environmental 
security has become an inextricable component of the three pillars of human security 
articulated through the UN – freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in 
dignity – and of strategies that focus on empowerment as well as protection. 
As Stephan Libiszewski (1992) asks ‘what is an environmental conflict’? According to 
Hagmann (2011; 2014), ‘environmental conflicts are, by definition, phenomena situated at 
the interface between the natural and social spheres’ Hagmann (2011; 2014:14). ENCOP 
                                        
55 Global Leadership for Climate Action, available at: http://www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/campaigns-
and-initiatives/global-leadership-for-climate-action/ accessed 25 April 2017. 
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categorizes environmental conflict into seven types: ethnopolitical conflict, international 
sharing of water/river basins conflicts, demography caused conflicts, centre-periphery 
conflicts, regional migration/displacement, stereotypical environmental conflicts, trans-
boundary migration conflicts and international conflicts as the results of neo-colonialist 
exploitation of the resources; most of these occur in developing countries (Baechler cited in 
Hagmann, 2014).  
Environmental security/scarcity or conflict theorist’s’ concept of environmental conflict 
research reflects misleading assumptions and definitions (Hagmann 2005). The core concept 
of resource scarcity as an independent variable in many studies is misleading ‘all natural 
resources are or can become scarce, and as scarcity by definition leads to conflicts of interest’ 
(Gleditsch 2001 cited in Hagmann 2014). Is resource scarcity promoting violent-conflict? It 
is recently acknowledged in the world of academic scholarship that natural resource scarcity 
may also be a reason for violent conflict and anti-regime struggles as in the case of the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria. Baechler (2011) further argues that the societies throughout the 
developing countries entrapped with natural disasters, drought, floods, pollution and 
chemical waste are unable to cope with environmental remediation and justice. Natural 
catastrophe and environmental disruption intertwined triggered internal tensions, power 
struggles and civil unrest. In the Niger Delta region of Nigeria as the result of environmental 
degradation and destructions, violent militants’ insurgency launches ‘eco-conflict’ against 
the state and oil companies. Most of the international agreements and treaties on 
environmental security and justice are not useful when it comes to the implementation stage.  
3.6.1: Critique of Environmental Security 
The anti-thetical conceptual approaches, levels of analysis and methodologies make a logical 
and consistent presentation of the literature on environmental conflicts complicated, like 
most   other contested concepts in international relations and development politics. The 
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growing interest and coloured debate in the field of environmental security56 somehow led 
to new attempts in redefining the term security over and over again (Baechler, 1999: 21-22). 
Hagman and Kibreab similarly argue that environmental scarcity “rarely contributes directly 
to interstate conflict”. Hagman (2014) further argues that the environmental conflict is 
fundamentally flawed, as it relies on preconceived causalities, intermingles eco-centric with 
anthropocentric philosophies, and neglects the motivations and subjective perceptions of 
local actors. 
3.7 Resource Governance Index (RGI) 
The Resource Governance Index (RGI) is one of the new frameworks that came into 
prominence in 2013 by the Natural Resources Governance Institute to measure the quality 
of governance in the oil, gas and mining sectors. The RGI assesses the quality of governance 
by examining four key governance components: the institutional and legal setting of the 
government, reporting practices in the revenue management, safeguards and quality controls 
(security) and environmental consideration. RGI also includes information on three unique 
mechanisms used commonly to govern oil, gas and minerals—state-owned companies, 
natural resource funds and sub-national revenue transfers. 
The findings of the RGI reports show that there is a significant governance deficit in  
developing countries, and the deficit is most significant in the most resource-dependent 
countries such as Nigeria, where over seventy per cent of the people live in poverty despite 
the abundance of oil wealth. Nigeria’s performance over the past decade has been 
characterised by low per capita economic growth, persistent impoverishment and 
environmental degradation (World Bank 2003; RGI, 2013).  
                                        
56 Research designs proposed by environmental conflict scholars have been challenged repeatedly. The 
Toronto Group, for instance, has been accused of violating important principles of research design, such as 
lacking control groups, offering imprecise variables, and neglecting variation on the dependent variable, all of 
which make the falsification of the hypotheses impossible. For details criticism see, Tobias Hagman (2015) 
‘Confronting the Concept of Environmentally Induced Conflict’. Available at: 
https://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/peace-conflict-and-development/issue-6/Environmental-conflict-
final-version-edited.pdf accessed 19 March 2018. 
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3.8 Resource Abundance Theory 
The abundance of natural resources particularly oil weakens the state institutions in the 
resource-rich developing countries. The abundance of oil has weakened the social, economic 
and stability of the Nigerian state in the Niger Delta region. The extraction of oil without 
due environmental consideration has made Nigeria “vulnerable to armed disputes framed 
within ideas of environmental confrontation” (Bayramov 2018:74) The prominent 
scholarship in the resource abundance debates was represented by (Sach and Warner 1995; 
Collier 2003, 2008, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004).  
It is an abundance of natural resources (not scarcity) that led to conflict ( Le Billion, 
Bayramov 201857). Also, Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) argued that resource abundant 
economies tend to have higher, not lower levels of GDP per capita with respect to resource-
poor countries. The abundance of resources in Nigeria have not benefited the people of the 
Niger Delta in particular due to institutional weakness at all levels of governance 
‘government failure can be rampant when institutional quality is poor’ (Polterovich 2010).  
The oil posed a greater danger to the peaceful coexistence of the unity of the country, low 
level of economic development and militarization of the Delta Niger environment (Salai-i-
Martin and Subramanian 2003 and Humphreys 2013). Nigeria suffers from endemic official 
corruption, while resource-poor countries such as Ghana, Malawi and Burkina Faso are 
relatively or economically weak but more peaceful and democratic than Nigeria or the 
Congo.  
Resource abundance in developing countries tends to generate adverse developmental 
outcomes, including weak economic performance, growth collapse, and high levels of 
                                        
57 Bayramov, A., 2017. Dubious nexus between natural resources and conflict. Journal of Eurasian Studies. 
Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S187936651730026X accessed 14 March 
2018. 
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corruption, ineffective governance and greater political violence. Natural resources, for most 
of the poor countries, are deemed to be more of a ‘curse’ than a ‘blessing’ (Di John 2009).  
It was evident that not all resource-rich countries failed to judiciously utilizes the natural 
resources wealth for the well-being of its people. For example, Indonesia and Nigeria—both 
dependent on oil, had comparable per capita incomes during 1960. While today, Indonesia’s 
per capita income is the US $3,570 and that of Nigeria stands at US 42,175 (World Bank 
201858; Polterovich 201059). Both, Nigeria and Indonesia in the 1960s and 1970s adopted 
many policies targeted towards the poor populations and rural works projects, the 
government of Nigeria did nothing comparable (Ross 2007:242). 
3.9 Resource Curse Theory (RCT) 
The proceeding theories discussed (greed versus grievance, resource curse, Dutch Disease, 
Horizontal Inequalities, Environmental security, Resource Governance Index and Resource 
abundance and scarcity) attempts to explain the phenomenon of natural resources conflict, 
but they are not entirely satisfactory.   
The theoretical arguments put forward are useful but generally inadequate for this study to 
use all the theories for various reasons. The theoretical framework for this research will be 
based on the ‘resource curse or Dutch Disease’. Under the resource curse theory, there are 
two main explanatory models; Dutch Disease and rentier model. I will use both the Dutch 
disease and rentier model as a framework; both models explain the current Nigeria situation. 
Multiple factors and issues cause conflicts, and a systematic approach is needed to 
understand and account for them in a more comprehensive way. This research builds on the 
work of Collier, Hoeffler, Auty and Sachs to create a full study of the resource-based 
problems in Nigeria and outlines how this could be applicable to other countries. In this 
                                        
58 World Bank ‘GDP Pern Capita Current’ (2018) Available at: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2016&locations=NG-
ID&start=2016&view=bar 
 
59 Polterovich, V., Popov, V. and Tonis, A., 2010. Resource abundance: A curse or blessing? Available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1814382 accessed 22 March 2018. 
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chapter, the theoretical framework position is also examined to explain the current problems 
oil-rich Nigeria is facing.  
The ‘resource curse’ theory was pioneered by Richard Auty and his colleagues in their 
various scholarly works (Auty 1993, 2004, 1994a, 1994b; Auty and Evans 1994; Sachs and 
Warner 1995, 2001, 1997, 1997). The so-called ‘resource curse’ is one of the most influential 
ideas in recent development discourse and policy. The term ‘resource curse’ is also known 
as the ‘paradox of plenty’; Richard Auty (1993) is the one who apparently coined the term 
‘resource curse’ in his ground-breaking book Sustaining Development in Mineral 
Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis. The natural resource curse thesis was later 
developed and popularised by Ross, Sachs and Warner (1995). The thesis argues that 
countries with an abundance of natural resources are more likely to perform worse, in terms 
of economic developmental and good governance, than their resource-scare counterparts. 
Moreover, while on the one hand, a lack of natural resources has not proven to be a fatal 
barrier to economic success, on the other hand, ‘resource-rich countries grew less rapidly 
than resource-poor countries during the last quarter of the twentieth century’ (Humphreys, 
Sachs and Stiglitz 2010). Nigeria is the most popular example of the “resource curse” cited 
within academia and the non-governmental sectors.  The most common problems associated 
with the resource curse thesis include: authoritarian rule (Ross 2013), vulnerability to price 
volatility, economic disarray (Sachs and Warner, 1995, Ross 2013:3), poverty, inequality 
and short-sighted policies (Ross 2013), increased likelihood of corruption, greater likelihood 
of violent armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Ross 2013) and extended conflict 
duration and weakened state institutions (Ballantine and Sharman 2003; Ross 2013). 
However, some countries have escaped each of these ailments and turned their natural 
resource wealth from curse to blessing (Ross 2013). Can Nigeria make the natural resources 
rent useful for the greater advantage of Nigerians just like Botswana did? 
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The Nigerian government raise over 80 per cent of the national revenues from oil instead of 
taxes. As such, the country fails to develop functioning bureaucracy that can intervene 
effectively in social conflicts. The result may be a heightened danger of violent civil conflict 
(Beblawi and Luciani 2016). Not all resource-rich countries are in such a bad situation; some 
have performed far better than others in the area of resource wealth management. For 
example, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Congo are all rich in diamonds, yet 
Botswana is the best performer in continental Africa in terms of democracy, accountability, 
stability, and rapid growth of income, while the countries of the Congo, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia are among the very worst in the world. Botswana’s economic growth and political 
stability are regularly celebrated in the academic literature (Pegg 2010)60. The IMF (2006)61 
working paper on Botswana argue:   
‘‘Botswana has benefited from the coexistence of good governance and abundant 
diamonds to materialize growth. No clear evidence can be found that deterioration 
in the terms of trade would negatively affect economic development, as the Dutch 
disease model would hypothesize’’. 
As Joseph Stiglitz (2004) asserts there is cure for the Dutch disease as Botswana did it 
through good governance. A similar pattern holds true. Though, oil has more corruption 
disposition than diamond to some greater extent. There is lesson to be learn from Botswana 
to address resource curse in the developing countries. For example, Sierra Leone and 
Botswana are both diamond rich countries in Africa.62  
                                        
60 Pegg (2010) further asserts that ‘Botswana has done about as well managing its resource wealth as could 
realistically be expected. The country does not suffer from a classic Dutch disease. It is, however, unlikely to 
succeed in diversifying its economy away from diamonds anytime soon’. Also, see Joseph Stiglitz (2004) 
analysis ‘We can now cure Dutch disease’ The Guardian (Newspaper), 18th August 2004. 
 
 
61 For example, see Iimi, A., 2006a. Did Botswana escape from the resource curse? IMF Working Paper 
WP/06/138. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.  
 
62 See, for example UNCTAD (2017) report titled “Diamond exports from Botswana and Sierra Leone: The 
role of institutions in mitigating the impact of commodity dependence on human development”. The UNCTAD 
report further argue: Indeed, both Botswana and Sierra Leone are dependent on commodities and do not add 
much value to the raw materials they export. In Botswana 86 per cent of export revenues in 2014 were attributed 
to diamonds whereas in Sierra Leone, commodities represented 97 per cent of total merchandise exports of 
which 12 per cent were from diamonds (UNCTAD, 2016). While Botswana is considered to have succeeded 
in using its revenues derived from diamonds to develop its economy and reduce poverty, Sierra Leone has 
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About thirty years ago, Nigeria and Indonesia had comparable economic development and 
income per capita and heavy dependencies on oil extraction sales. Today, Indonesia’s per 
capita income is four times that of Nigeria (Ross 2003, Frankel 2010 and Stiglitz 2007). 
What are the causes of violent oil conflict in Nigeria? Many resource-rich countries in the 
developing world seem to suffer from it; only a few do not. Several scholars and analysts, 
Auty (1993; 2013), Ross (2013) point towards rent-seeking and corruption as core elements 
of what causes this curse. Extractive economies provide a useful but challenging space for 
theorising on resource conflict. Extractive economies are societies that depend solely or 
partly on benefits arriving from the exploration, extraction, marketing and distribution of 
natural resources, commonly described as rent, rather than production and manufacturing, 
investment or the management of risk (Omeje 2008). One of the earliest theories developed 
to understand the political economy of resource-abundant states is the rentier state model. 
This perspective has a number of shortcomings, for instance, it is state-centred, and needs a 
complementary framework to capture emerging realities of poverty and bad governance in 
the developing countries. 
The main areas of academic investigation of resource curse in the resource-rich countries 
like Nigeria are economic growth and stability. When examining economic growth and the 
experience of economic growth, strong institutions are an essential factor. To fulfil the 
criteria of strong institutions, good governance must exist within these institutions. A strong 
public voice with accountability, high government effectiveness, good regulation, and 
powerful anti-corruption policies are all essential for institutions to possess in order to 
consider themselves strong institutions with good governance. In regard to institutions and 
                                        
experienced very low levels of economic and human development in the context of a long civil war. For 
example, using a poverty line of $1.90 per day in purchasing power parity (ppp), the poverty headcount ratio 
in Botswana dropped from 29.8 per cent in 2002 to 18.2 per cent in 2009. In Sierra Leone, it went from 58.5 
per cent in 2003 to 52.3 per cent in 2011. Available at:  
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/suc2017d9_en.pdf 
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the importance of well-established institutions, the article by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 
“Institutions and the resource curse” argues for a link between the GDP growth of a nation 
and the performance of its political institutions (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006; pp.1-3). 
Mehlum et al., argue for a correlation between the growth of GDP and the established 
institutions within a state. This means that growth performance of resource-rich countries is 
dependent on how resource rent is distributed at the institutions (Mehlum, Moene and 
Torvik, 2006; p.3). Countries which to an extent experience the consequences of the 
resources curse often have institutions, where production and rent-seeking are competing for 
activities (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006:3). An element of the resource curse is, 
therefore, present when institutions become ‘grabber friendly’. ‘Grabber friendly’ 
institutions imply that being a producer in the competition for natural resources, rent is a 
disadvantage (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2005:7). For example, since early 2015; as a 
result of collapsed  petroleum prices in the global market,  Nigeria has slipped into 
recession63. By having ‘grabber friendly’ institutions, the growth performance can turn 
negative, when “resource abundance attracts scarce entrepreneurial resources out of 
production and into unproductive activities” (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006:3). 
Therefore, when institutions are ‘grabber friendly’ rent-seeking activities tend to increase 
without contributing to the existing wealth. This leads to poor economic development and 
entrenches poverty and illiteracy among the populace. The term of ‘grabber friendly’ 
institutions is, therefore, important in order to understand the role of the institution. By 
having bad institutions without good governance and an abundance of natural resources, 
entrepreneurs are more easily tempted to become grabbers, which leads to undermining the 
                                        
63 Nigerian economy slips into recession, Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37228741 
accessed 15 October 2016. 
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incitement to undertake production (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2005:11). This institution 
will, therefore, be defined as bad institutions, where there is a disadvantage of being a 
producer in the competition for natural resource rents (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2005:7). 
The correlation between bad institutions and the resource curse are therefore relevant when 
examining the presence of the resource curse within Nigeria. Together with the quality of 
institutions, another aspect in regard to the resource curse is economic performance. As 
studies have argued that countries with an abundance of natural resources tend to experience 
a decline in international trade, which ultimately will lead to poor economic growth and 
development (Rosser, 2006:13). Others have argued for a problem within resource-rich 
nations that the instability and volatility of the international commodity market would be 
transferred to the domestic economies and thereby affect the incitement from private foreign 
investors to invest (Rosser, 2006:13). Such changes in the economy would affect countries 
in their future development. While examining the resource curse on the case of Nigeria, this 
research project is aware of the importance of the relationship between economy and the 
political variability in connection to this relationship. Therefore, when examining the case 
of Nigeria, the concept of ‘Dutch Disease’ is interesting. As mentioned, the research project 
is to analyse the different sectors such as manufacturing in order to illuminate a possible 
correlation between natural resources and poor growth within other sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing. By suffering from the resource curse, nations would 
experience larger risk to be exposed to ‘Dutch Disease’. When examining such sectors, the 
project is able to answer whether or not ‘Dutch Disease’ affects the manufacturing sector in 
regard to the changes that might occur in exports and imports. The ’Dutch Disease’, when 
examining Nigeria, is an interesting factor in connection with the country's large oil reserves 
in the Niger Delta region. Either by discovering natural resources such as oil or by an 
increase in the price of commodity exports, a nation will experience a lift in the value of the 
currency, which leads manufacturing goods to become less competitive. Such change within 
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the sector of manufacturing goods results in a decline in exports and leads imports to 
increase. The effects of ‘Dutch Disease’ are negative or slow performance within the non-
oil export sectors because of worsening competitiveness (Ploeg, 2011:368). This worsening 
of competitiveness can result in a decline in the manufacturing sector (Ploeg, 2011:374).  
 
Figure 7 Theoretical Model 
Note: I propose above figure 7 as a revised theoretical model to explain the characteristics 
and complexities of natural resource governance issues in Nigeria. 
 
Also, Nigeria’s natural resource wealth has not served its population as well as it should 
because certain key institutions remain weak or non-existent and a small kleptocratic ruling 
elite has perpetuated and taken advantage of this vacuum (Okonjo-Iweala 2018). The decline 
in the manufacturing sector of the economy clearly manifests itself in Nigeria.  
 
